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PLUGGING THE HOLES IN THE EX PARTE
REEXAMINATION STATUTE: PREVENTING A
SECOND BITE AT THE APPLE FOR A PATENT
INFRINGER
Betsy Johnson'
As the old maxim goes, "If at first you don't succeed, [t]ry, try again."'
While such persistence may promote success in the fields of education,
business, and scientific research, it has no place in judicial proceedings, as
reflected in the judicial principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata
Although procedural safeguards in theory prevent parties from enjoying
a second bite at the apple, parties nonetheless exploit loopholes in the
laws that allow them to do so.'
One such loophole exists in patent law.4
For instance, in
MercExchange L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc.,5 the jury found that the defendant
willfully infringed two patents, and awarded significant damages to the
patent owner.6 While the case was pending on appeal, the defendant
requested, and the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO)
' J.D. Candidate, 2006, Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
licensed to practice before the United States Patent and Trademark Office.
1. William Edward Hickson, English Educationist, 'Try and Try Again', in THE
TIMES BOOK OF QUOTATIONS 534 (2000).
2. See Burson v. Carmichael, 731 F.2d 849, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("There is no
support in law for repeated bites at the apple. On the contrary, the law whenever possible
reaches for repose."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 & cmts. a-c (1982)
(explaining that res judicata is a common-law doctrine that precludes the relitigation of a
claim or issue after a valid and final judgment has been reached). The doctrine of res
judicata encompasses two doctrines-claim preclusion, known as merger and bar, and
issue preclusion, known as collateral estoppel. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVENHANSEN, UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 106[B], [D] (2d ed. 1994). The doctrine
of claim preclusion prohibits a party from relitigating the same claim in a future lawsuit.
Id. § 106[D][1]. The doctrine of issue preclusion precludes relitigation of the same issue
by any party. Id. § 106[D][2].
3. See, e.g., Krevsky v. United States, 186 F.3d 237, 242 (2d Cir. 1999) (Tsoucalas, J.,
dissenting) (recognizing that a remand for resentencing de novo creates a loophole that
allows a criminal defendant an opportunity for a second bite at the apple).
4. See Robert M. Asher, Re-examination: The Tail that Wags the Dog, INTELL.
PROP. STRATEGIST (Law Journal Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), May 2004, at 1, 6.
5. 275 F. Supp. 2d 695 (E.D. Va. 2003), affd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.3d 1323
(Fed. Cir. 2005).
6. Id. at 698-99. After a five-week trial, a jury found that eBay willfully infringed
two of the plaintiff's patents. Id. The jury held eBay liable for $35 million in damages. Id.
at 698; see also Jeffrey D. Sullivan & Thomas M. Morrow, Patent Law: Recent Reexaminations, NAT'L L.J., May 2, 2005, at 14, 14.
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granted, a reexamination of the infringed patents, challenging their
patentability. 7 Invalidation of the patents-in-suit in this posttrial extrajudicial proceeding could have the effect of absolving the adjudicated
infringer of liability for the tort it committed.8 Remarkably, in seventyfour percent of reexamination proceedings the PTO concludes that a
patent is wholly or partially invalid-odds that could tempt any
adjudicated infringer. 9

As unfair as it may seem, posttrial reexaminations are not unheard of.
For instance, they have been granted after at least three recent highprofile patent infringement cases, although the requesters are typically
third parties other than an adjudicated infringer. ° While reexaminations
are undoubtedly beneficial, the danger inherent in a posttrial
reexamination lies in the possibility that the PTO, with the stroke of a
pen, can undo a final judgment of an Article III court.1' If adjudicated
infringers routinely request reexaminations of the very patents they
infringe, one might ask, what was the point of a trial on the merits in the
first place?
This predicament leads to some important issues for consideration.
For instance, under principles of separation of powers, is it constitutional
for the PTO, an administrative agency, to consider a reexamination
request from an adjudicated infringer when the result may be to nullify
7. Sullivan & Morrow, supra note 6, at 14.
8. Patents/Reexamination:Browser Patent Infringed by Microsoft Is Rejected in PTO
Reexamination Action, 67 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 417, 417 (Mar. 12, 2004)
(recounting the possible effect a reexamination may have on Microsoft in Eolas
Technologies Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., No. 99 C 0626, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 534 (N.D. I11.
Jan. 14, 2004), affd in part, vacated in part, 399 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2005)); see also
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 996 F.2d 1236, No. 93-1208, 1993 WL
172432, at *1 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 1993) (unpublished table decision).
9. See Paul Morgan & Bruce Stoner, Reexamination vs. Litigation-Making
Intelligent Decisions in ChallengingPatent Validity, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y
441, 460-61 (2004) (referencing 2003 statistics from the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO), showing that for the years 1981-2003, sixty-four percent of the
reexaminations resulted in claim amendments and ten percent resulted in all claims being
cancelled while twenty-six percent of reexaminations resulted in all claims being
confirmed).
10. See Patents: Reexam for Patents Infringed by BlackBerry, 65 Pat. Trademark &
Copyright J. (BNA) 301, 301 (Jan. 31, 2003) (reporting that after the court issued a
summary judgment of infringement in NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 261 F. Supp.
2d 423, 425 (E.D. Va. 2002), affd in part, rev'd in part, 392 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2004),
withdrawn and substituted by 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005), the PTO ordered the
reexamination of five of the patents in suit); Sullivan & Morrow, supra note 6, at 14
(reporting that the PTO agreed to reexamine the patents at issue in Eolas and
MercExchange after the courts announced infringement verdicts).
11. Standard Havens, 1993 WL 172432, at *1. A recently published article advocates
the use of the reexamination process as a defensive strategy for a defendant, recognizing
the power of the PTO over the federal court system. Asher, supra note 4, at 1, 6.
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the decision of an Article III court and absolve the adjudicated infringer
of liability? 2 Furthermore, on a practical level, should the PTO and the
federal courts make the reexamination proceeding available to a
defendant after a final judgment, or even after significant discovery has
taken place? 3 While reexamination is available to cure mistakes made
by the PTO, posttrial review of a patent contravenes another important
of public and
purpose of the reexamination statute-to prevent a waste
4
private resources spent during an infringement lawsuit.
This Comment focuses on the issues presented by posttrial
reexaminations requested by an adjudicated infringer. This Comment
first explains the Ex Parte Reexamination Statute and reviews federal
case law to illustrate the current roles of and relationships between the
PTO and the federal courts in determining a patent's validity. Next, this
Comment analyzes the relevant constitutional provisions, statutes, and
case law addressing principles of separation of powers that should
prevent an administrative review of a judicial decision. Ultimately, this
Comment concludes that because the current laws are insufficient to
prevent a posttrial reexamination under these circumstances, Congress
should revise the Ex Parte Reexamination Statute so that a party may
not question patentability on the basis of patents and publications that
the party previously presented or could have presented at trial. In
addition, this Comment urges federal courts to disallow the results of
posttrial reexaminations to control or influence their final judgments.
I. THE NATURE OF PATENTS
In order to promote the useful arts and sciences, the United States
Constitution grants Congress broad power to pass laws granting
inventors a limited monopoly over their discoveries.' 5 Pursuant to this
authority, Congress enacted the Patent Act 16 which, among other things,

12. See discussion infra Parts IV.A, V.C.
13. See Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal To Change the Patent Reexamination Statute
To Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation, 27 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 887, 895 (1994) (arguing

that reexaminations should be concluded in the early stages of litigation).
14. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 720 F. Supp. 373, 385
n.14 (D. Del. 1989) (noting that a timely decision in the reexamination of a patent-in-suit
"may cheaply dispose of the suit before the parties or the court have expended time and
resources"); H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N
6460, 6462-63; see also infra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
15. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 (stating that Congress has the power "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to ... Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective ... Discoveries").
16. Act of July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 792 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 1376 (2000)). As a historical note, the original patent statute was enacted by the first
Congress and signed into law by George Washington in 1790. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7,
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grants a patent owner the right to exclude others from making, using,
selling, or offering to sell his or her invention in the United States for a
period of twenty years."
To be awarded a patent, an applicant must present an application that
distinctly claims the particular invention he wants patented, as well as
discloses to the public the best mode of carrying out the invention, and
enables someone to make and use the invention.' s The PTO ischarged
with examining each application to determine if it will grant a patent to
the applicant. The PTO assigns each application to a patent examiner,

who conducts an ex parte examination to determine the patentability of

1 Stat. 109; see also ROGER E. SCHECHTER & JOHN R. THOMAS, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY § 13.2.4-.6 (2003).

17. See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1)-(2). The current statute provides that "[e]very patent
shall... grant to the patentee ... the right to exclude others from making, using, offering
for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States." Id. § 154(a)(1). "[S]uch
grant shall be for a term ... ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States .... ." Id. § 154(a)(2). The patent laws seek to
promote "progress by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to
inventors to risk the often enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development."
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480 (1974). This twenty-year exclusionary
period is a property right. Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877).
18. See 35 U.S.C. § 112. An application is the document that forms the basis for
defining individual patent rights. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 16, §§ 18.1-.2
(describing the patent application process as mandated by the Patent Code). An
application contains two distinct parts: (1) a specification, which describes the invention in
detail; and (2) claims, which set forth the proprietary rights possessed by the patent owner.
Id. § 18.1, at 394, § 18.2, at 404. A specification generally includes the title, an abstract, a
detailed description, and drawings, if necessary. 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.71-.74, .77, .81 (2003); see
also SCHECTER & THOMAS, supra note 16, § 18.1, at 394; U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK
OFFICE, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE §

608.01 (rev. 8th ed. 2004) thereinafter M.P.E.P.].
The statute requires that the
specification fulfill three distinct requirements: enablement, written description, and best
mode. 35 U.S.C. § 112. The first paragraph of § 112 provides that the specification must
"enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly
connected, to make and use" the claimed invention. Id.; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.71. The
second paragraph of § 112 requires that the patent include a written description of the
invention, sufficient to demonstrate that the inventor has possession of the invention as of
the filing date of the application. 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.71; SCHECHTER &
THOMAS, supra note 16, § 18.1.2, at 348. The third requirement, as set forth in the third
paragraph of § 112, is that the specification "set forth the best mode contemplated by the
inventor of carrying out his invention." 35 U.S.C. § 112; see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.71. This
requirement ensures that the inventor discloses to the public the best method of
implementing the invention, so that after expiration of the patent competitors can
compete on equal footing. See SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 16, § 18.1.3, at 401.
19. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 2(a), 131. The PTO is an administrative agency within the
Department of Commerce, and is under the policy direction of the Secretary of
Commerce. Id. § 1. The Director of the PTO is "appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate." Id. § 3. The Secretary of Commerce appoints a
Commissioner of Patents, who is responsible for managing the operations of the PTO. Id.
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the claimed invention. 20 At the outset, the examiner bears the burden of
establishing a prima facie case of unpatentability.2' If the examiner fails
to meet this burden, then the applicant is entitled to a patent. 22 However,
if the examiner meets the burden, and rejects the application as
unpatentable, the burden shifts to the applicant to demonstrate by
amendment, argument, or both, that the claimed invention consists of
patentable subject matter and satisfies the statutory requirements of
novelty, definiteness, utility, and nonobviousness.23
Patentability is
determined on the entirety of the record-by a preponderance of the
24
evidence and the weight of argument.
If the applicant demonstrates

20. Id. § 131; see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.102, .104. The PTO is organized into various
Examining Groups, organized by technical specialties. See SCHECTER & THOMAS, supra
note 16, § 19.1, at 422. When the PTO receives a patent application, the PTO staff
forwards it to an examining group and individual examiner that have expertise with that
type of invention. Id. § 19.2.3, at 425. The examiner conducts a search of the prior art and
determines whether the invention as described and claimed is patentable. Id. An
invention is patentable if it satisfies the statutory requirements of novelty, definiteness,
utility and nonobviousness. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103. An invention is novel when it is not
known to the public such as through sale, use, or disclosure in a patent or printed
publication. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2002). An invention satisfies the utility requirement when the invention is capable of
use and performs some beneficial function that is not clearly illegal. See In re Nelson, 280
F.2d 172, 179 (C.C.P.A. 1960), overruled by In re Kirk, 376 F.2d 936 (C.C.P.A. 1967). The
standard for nonobviousness as set forth by the Supreme Court requires a factual inquiry
as to: (1) the scope and content of the prior art; (2) the difference between the invention
and the prior art; (3) the level of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention; and
(4) objective evidence of secondary considerations, such as commercial success or
unexpected results. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-18 (1966); see also M.P.E.P.,
supra note 18, § 2141 ("Office policy is to follow Graham v. John Deere Co. in the
consideration and determination of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. [§] 103."). Upon
compiling this information, the PTO must determine whether the invention as claimed
would be obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art. Id. § 2142 ("In view of all factual
information, the examiner must then make a determination whether the claimed invention
'as a whole' would have been obvious at that time to [the hypothetical person of ordinary
skill in the art]."). The examiner must notify the applicant in writing whether he has
rejected any of the application's claims. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.2, 1.104. The
entire examination process is confidential between the PTO and the applicant. 35 U.S.C. §
122(a).
21. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1445 (Fed. Cir. 1992); In re Piasecki, 745 F.2d 1468,
1472 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
22. Oeticker, 977 F.2d at 1445.
23. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); 37 C.F.R. § 1.111; M.P.E.P., supra note 18, § 714 (describing
the amendment process). If the examiner rejects a claim, the applicant may argue that the
rejection is improper or may amend the claim to overcome the rejection. See 37 C.F.R. §
1.111. The examiner may then consider the applicant's response, and reconsider the
patentability of the invention. 35 U.S.C. § 132(a); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.112.
24. Oeticker, 977 F.2d at 1445; Piasecki,745 F.2d at 1472.
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that the application satisfies 2the statutory requirements for patentability,
the PTO will award a patent. 1
On the other hand, if the patent examiner persists in rejecting the
application, the applicant may appeal the final rejection to the PTO's
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences.26 If still dissatisfied, the
applicant may bring a civil action in the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia to compel the Director of the PTO to issue the
patent.27 And if the applicant is dissatisfied with either of these decisions,
the applicant may appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit.28 If the applicant prevails in any of these proceedings,
then the PTO will issue a patent to the applicant. 9
II. PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGATION
A patent is a property right, granting the owner a twenty-year
exclusionary period during which he is entitled to prevent others from
practicing his invention.30 A person infringes the patent rights of another
if he "makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells" the patented invention without
the
permissionhe of
patent
owner."
If a patent
ownerin learns
of
infringement,
maytheseek
a remedy
by bringing
a civil action
a federal

25. 35 U.S.C. § 151.
26. Id. § 134(a). If the examiner remains unconvinced, and rejects a claim twice, the
rejection is considered final, and the patent owner has three options to proceed within the
PTO: (1) abandon the application; (2) file a continuing application to continue the
prosecution in the PTO; or (3) appeal the examiner's decision to the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences, or file a petition with the Director to object to the examiner's
actions. Id. §§ 133-134; see also 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.53(b), .113, .114, .181, .191.
27. 35 U.S.C. § 145. The civil action is a de novo determination of patentability, not
limited to the administrative record from the ex parte examination. See Newman v.
Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1579 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 886 F.2d 329 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 1989
U.S. App. LEXIS 14954 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 30, 1989). The applicant may introduce new
evidence of patentability but may not introduce new issues. See DeSeversky v. Brenner,
424 F.2d 857, 858 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
28. 35 U.S.C. § 141. When reviewing a Board decision, the proceeding is considered
a judicial review of an administrative action, subject to the review standards of the
Administrative Procedures Act (APA). 5 U.S.C. §§ 559, 706 (2000); Dickinson v. Zurko,
527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). Thus, the Federal Circuit reviews the Board's decision to
determine if it is supported by substantial evidence. See 5 U.S.C. § 559, Zurko, 527 U.S. at
162 (citing Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 325 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)).
29. 35 U.S.C. §§ 144-145.
30. 35 U.S.C. §§ 154(a), 261 ("[P]atents shall have the attributes of personal
property."); see also Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1877) ("A patent for
an invention is as much property as a patent for land."). The exclusionary period is
currently calculated as twenty years from the date on which the application is filed. 35
U.S.C. § 154(a)(2).
31. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
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If a court or jury finds that the accused party has

infringed the patent at issue, the court may grant the patent owner
injunctive relief, damages, or both.33
Although an infringer can technically infringe an invalid patent claim,
an invalid patent claim cannot give rise to liability for infringement.34
Although validity and infringement are distinct issues in a patent
infringement lawsuit, a determination of validity is essential to a finding
of liability for infringement.35
Congress has established means for
determining the validity of a patent
in either a federal court or in the
36
PTO, as discussed further below.
A. JudicialReview of Patent Validity
Once a patent is issued by the PTO, courts will presume it is valid,"
placing the burden on a challenger to prove otherwise.38 At trial, an
accused infringer may raise the statutory defense that the patent-in-suit is
invalid, opening the matter of patent validity for resolution by the trier of
fact.39

32. Id. § 281. The federal district courts have exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising
under the patent laws, including patent infringement lawsuits. 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000).
33. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283-284. The statute requires damages in the form of no less than a
reasonable royalty. Id. § 284. Generally "an injunction will issue when infringement has
been adjudged, absent a sound reason for denying it." Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co.,
868 F.2d 1226, 1247 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
34. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(commenting that the principle that "invalid claims cannot be infringed [is] a nonsense
statement"); Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (commenting that "an invalid claim cannot give rise to liability for infringement");
see also Unique Concepts, Inc. v. Brown, 939 F.2d 1558, 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (Rich, J.,
dissenting) (asserting that "[ilnvalid claims can perfectly well be infringed .... Courts
constantly hold claims infringed but invalid").
35. Medtronic, 721 F.2d at 1583 ("Though an invalid claim cannot give rise to liability
for infringement, whether it is infringed is an entirely separate question capable of
determination without regard to its validity."); see also Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359,
363, 365-66 (1943) (holding that a finding of noninfringement does not render moot the
claim of invalidity); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 936 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that the district court erroneously combined the issues of validity and
infringement).
36. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 282, 30t-318; McNeil-PPC, Inc. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 767 F.
Supp. 1081, 1086 (D. Colo. 1991) (noting that a non-patent owner is permitted to challenge
the validity of a patent in the PTO and in the district court).
37. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
38. See id.; Avia Group Int'l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear Cal., Inc., 853 F.2d 1557, 1562 (Fed.
Cir. 1988). The presumption of validity may be viewed as a presumption of correctness of
the administrative review. Brooktree Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 977 F.2d
1555, 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
39. 35 U.S.C. § 282. An alleged infringer may also bring an action for declaratory
judgment of invalidity, if there is a "reasonable threat that the patentee ... will bring an
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A federal court determines the validity of a patent using the same
statutory •• patentability
requirements used in the PTO's initial
40
examination. However, in resolving the issue of a patent's validity, the
court is not limited to a review of the correctness of the examination-a
litigant may introduce other evidence, such as expert testimony, relevant
to the patent's validity.41
A court analyzes each patent claim
independently, holding the claim invalid only if an accused infringer
overcomes the presumption of validity with clear and convincing
evidence.42 If the accused infringer does not meet his evidentiary burden,
infringement action against [him]." Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846
F.2d 731, 736-37 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 955 (Fed. Cir. 1987). Where validity is not
at issue, a trial court is not required to decide validity. See Pall Corp. v. Hemasure Inc.,
181 F.3d 1305, 1308 & n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int'l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83 (1993)); Lannom Mfg. Co., Inc. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 799 F.2d 1572,
1579 (Fed. Cir. 1986) ("It is beyond cavil that a district court does not have authority to
invalidate a patent at its own initiative if validity is not challenged by a party.").
40. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d
558, 566-67 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (en banc) (commenting that any of the statutory requirements
for patentability are adequate for invalidating an issued patent), vacated, 535 U.S. 722
(2002). The Federal Circuit has held that while 35 U.S.C. § 282 provides a list of defenses,
it is not an exhaustive list; other invalidity defenses exist. See, e.g., Quantum Corp. v.
Rodime, PLC, 65 F.3d 1577, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (holding that 35 U.S.C. § 305 is an
invalidity defense, even though it is not specifically provided in § 282).
41. See Applied Materials, Inc. v. Advanced Semiconductor Materials Am., Inc., 98
F.3d 1563, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 774 F.2d 1082, 1094
(Fed. Cir. 1985), vacated, 475 U.S. 809 (1986). The court owes some deference to the
decisions of the PTO, particularly where the PTO has reviewed a piece of prior art that is
before the court. See Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson & Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc.,
976 F.2d 1559, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The presentation of additional evidence at trial that
was not considered by the PTO does not change the presumption of validity, but it may
make the burden easier to carry. Applied Materials,98 F.3d at 1569.
42. 35 U.S.C. § 282; Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343,
1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (holding that "infringement and validity analyses must be performed
on a claim-by-claim basis"); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Phillip Morris Inc.,
229 F.3d 1120, 1124 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Ortho Pharm. Corp. v. Smith, 959 F.2d 936, 942 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (interpreting § 282 to require that all grounds of invalidity must be evaluated
against each individual claim); Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135,
138 (Fed. Cir. 1986); RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 1444
(Fed. Cir. 1984). Although the statute does not set forth the appropriate standard of
review, the Federal Circuit has recognized the standard to be clear and convincing
evidence. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson, 229 F.3d at 1124; Carella, 804 F.2d at 138.
Although not precisely defined, clear and convincing evidence is an intermediate standard
described as "evidence which produces in the mind of the trier of fact 'an abiding
conviction that the truth of [the] factual contentions are "highly probable."' Buildex Inc.
v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d 1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (alteration in original) (quoting
Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984)). Any of the statutory requirements of
patentability are adequate grounds for invalidating a claim of an issued patent. 35 U.S.C.
§ 282; see, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 1350, 1358-59 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (holding claims invalid because they failed to satisfy the utility requirement of
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the court will uphold the validity of one or more of the claims, finding
that they are "not invalid" based on the record.43
Although infringement and validity are separate issues at trial, a
defendant is liable only for infringing valid patent claims." If some
claims of a patent are invalid, then a court determines the infringer's
liability on the basis of any remaining valid claims.S If all claims of a
patent are invalid, then the accused infringer is not liable for
infringement.4 6
B. Administrative Review of Patentability- Reexamination
Initially, Congress vested power to invalidate patents primarily in the
district courts, although the PTO also had limited power in this area.47 In
an effort to reduce the amount of patent litigation in the federal courts,
Congress enacted the Ex Parte Reexamination Statute in December
1980.48 The statute establishes an administrative proceeding that allows
35 U.S.C. § 101); Atlas Powder Co. v. Ireco, Inc., 190 F.3d 1342, 1347-49 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding claims invalid as anticipated under 35 U.S.C. § 102); Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v.
Ampex Corp., 190 F.3d 1300, 1308-14 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding claims invalid as obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1377-78 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) (holding claims invalid because the were not enabled under 35 U.S.C. § 112);
Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1478-80 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding
claims invalid for failing to comply with the written description requirement of 35 U.S.C. §
112); U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat'l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212, 1216 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(holding claims invalid for failing to satisfy the best mode requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112);
Morton Int'l, Inc. v. Cardinal Chem. Co., 5 F.3d 1464, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (holding
claims invalid for a failure to satisfy the definiteness requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112).
43. See, e.g., Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1993);
Panduit Corp., 810 F.2d at 1569-70 (finding that the patent challenger did not carry the
"burden of establishing invalidity in the particular case before the court" under 35 U.S.C.
§ 282); Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("A patent
is not held valid for all purposes but, rather, not invalid on the record before the court.").
44. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1535 (Fed. Cir. 1987);
Medtronic, Inc. v. Cardiac Pacemakers, Inc., 721 F.2d 1563, 1583 (Fed. Cir. 1983); see also
Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 363-64 (1943); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d
932, 936 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
45. 35 U.S.C. § 288.
46. See Medtronic,721 F.2d at 1582-83.
47. Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 585 F. Supp. 713, 718 (E.D. Pa. 1983) afjfd in part,
rev'd in part, 758 F.2d 594 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Prior to
1980, the PTO had authority to invalidate patents through interference proceedings,
where inventorship is at issue, 35 U.S.C. § 135, and reissue proceedings, in which a patent
owner requests a correction of his patent, id. § 251.
48. Act of Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (codified as amended at 35
U.S.C. §§ 301-307). The title of Chapter 30 of 35 U.S.C. was changed in 1999 to "Ex Parte
Reexamination of Patents" from "Reexamination of Patents." The Optional Inter Partes
Reexamination Procedure Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 app.I, § 4602, 113 Stat. 1501 A521, 1501A-567 (codified at 35 U.S.C. prec. § 301). The primary purpose of the statute was
to strengthen the value of issued patents by making their validity more certain. H.R. REP.
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any party to challenge the validity of a patent without resorting to costly
litigation. 9 The statute allows "any person at any time" to file a request
to have a patent reexamined by the PTO if that person believes that
there is an issue regarding patentability that was not considered during
the initial examination. 0
Congress intended the ex parte reexamination procedure to provide
three benefits. 5' First, reexamination allows parties to resolve validity
Second,
disputes through the PTO without expensive litigation.52
reexamination allows the federal district courts to benefit from the
expertise of the PTO in reviewing prior art. 53 Third, reexamination may
strengthen confidence in patents that are clouded by a defective initial
examination.54 While individuals and courts have realized these benefits,
challengers have not used the ex parte reexamination procedure as often
as Congress anticipated, leaving many of the validity debates for the
federal court system to resolve.55

No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6460, 6462-63. Congress
intended the new reexamination procedure to permit resolution of patent validity disputes
without lengthy and expensive litigation. Id.; see also Motsenbocker, supra note 13, at 892.
Congress estimated that the cost of a reexamination in the PTO could be 100 times less
than a court-rendered validity determination. Id.
49. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-311; H.R. REP. NO. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N at 6462-63.
50. 35 U.S.C. § 302. This includes, for example, a patent owner, a licensee, or another
third-party requester. SCHECHTER & THOMAS, supra note 16, § 19.6.4.1. The Director
may initiate a reexamination, 35 U.S.C. § 303(a), although this rarely occurs. See Morgan
(citing statistics from the 2003 USPTO
& Stoner, supra note 9, at 459 tbl.13A
Performance and Accountability Report, showing that for the years 1999-2003 only about
four percent of the requests were initiated by the Commissioner). By comparison, patent
owners initiate approximately forty-three percent, and third parties initiate approximately
fifty-three percent of reexamination requests. Id. The requirement of "substantial new
question of patentability" prevents patentees from having to respond to unjustified
reexaminations. Kaufmann Co. v. Lantech Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (citing
H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 7, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6466).
51. In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1996); see also H.R.
REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6462.
52. See Recreative Techs., 83 F.3d at 1396; Kaufman, 807 F.2d at 976.
53. Recreative Techs., 83 F.3d at 1396; see also Patent Reexamination: Hearing on S.
1679 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,96th Cong. 22-23 (1979) (statement of Donald R.
Dunner, President of the American Patent Law Association).
54. Recreative Techs., 83 F.3d at 1396. It is for this reason that a patent owner may
want to initiate a reexamination of his own patent. See Asher, supra note 4, at 6.
55. See Motsenbocker, supra note 13, at 892 & n.27; William G. Conger, Comment,
PatentReexamination Reexamined, 1986 DETROIT C. L. REV. 523, 524-25 & n.5.
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The procedure for ex parte reexamination
is relatively
straightforward 6 Any person, including the patent owner, may submit a
reexamination request to the PTO, along with patents and printed
publications that the requester believes are relevant to the patentability
of the patent. 7 After reviewing the request, if the PTO determines that
there is a "substantial new question of patentability," the PTO will order
a reexamination of the patent. 58 At this point, the patent owner has an
opportunity to make a statement regarding the patentability of the
patent in light of the prior art.5
A third-party requester has an
opportunity to respond to a patent owner's statement, but this is the
requester's last contribution to the examination. The assigned examiner
then considers the patent, the cited references, and the statements,.
examining the patent using the same guidelines as the initial PTO
examination." In essence, the reexamination procedure allows the PTO
to review the patent again, correcting errors made during the initial

examination. 2

56. See, e.g., N. Thane Bauz, Reanimating U.S. Patent Reexamination:
Recommendations for Change Based upon a Comparative Study of German Law, 27
CREIGHTON L. REV. 945, 951 (1994).

57. 35 U.S.C. § 302 (2000); see also M.P.E.P, supra note 18, § 2212.
58. 35 U.S.C. § 304.
59. Id.
60. See id. ("If the patent owner files such a statement, he promptly will serve a copy
of it on the person who has requested reexamination . .. that person may file and have
considered in the reexamination a reply to any statement filed by the patent owner."); In
re Opprecht, 868 F.2d 1264, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that Congress intended to
provide limits to the participation of third parties so that the reexamination procedure
would closely parallel the existing examination procedures). However, in actuality, not all
ex parte reexaminations are truly ex parte. See In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 862 (Fed. Cir.
1985) (Nies, J., concurring). In Etter, Justice Nies noted that the ex parte reexamination at
issue was not truly ex parte in nature-the alleged infringer "forced the reexamination,
filed a brief analyzing the art[,] ... filed a reply to the patent owner's objection, was served
with copies oi examiner's actions[,] ... and was permitted to intervene." Id.
61. 35 U.S.C. § 305. However, some special rules pertain to reexaminations.
SCHECTER & THOMAS, supra note 16, § 19.6.4.1. For example, the PTO must conduct all
reexamination proceedings with "special dispatch." 35 U.S.C. § 305. In addition, the
patent owner may not enlarge the scope of his invention by amending claims or
introducing new claims. Id.
62. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 601, 603 (Fed. Cir.), modified, 771
F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (finding that the reexamination statute is in the class of curative
statutes, intended "to cure defects in administrative agency action with regard to
particular patents and to remedy perceived shortcomings in the system by which patents
are issued"). However, a reexamination is limited to issues not raised during the initial
examination. In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997) ("[A]
rejection made during reexamination does not raise a substantial new question of
patentability if it is supported only by prior art previously considered by the PTO."); see
also In re Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1397-99 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that in
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The presumption of validity afforded the patent in litigation does not
apply to the reexamination procedure.63 Instead, the PTO examines
patentability anew in light of the newly presented prior art. 64 If the
examiner rejects one or more of the claims, the patentee must persuade
the examiner by a preponderance
of the evidence that his patent satisfies
•65
the statutory requirements.
The patent owner may amend claims and
add new claims to the patent during reexamination. 66 However, the
patent owner may not enlarge the scope of the patent beyond what was
initially claimed.67
The result of reexamination may be: (1) the PTO upholds patent in its
entirety; (2) the PTO upholds the patent, but its scope is narrowed by the
cancellation or amendment of one or more claims; or (3) the PTO
cancels all of the patent claims. 6s If the PTO affirms all of the claims in
original or amended form, the PTO issues a certificate of confirmation,
and the reexamined patent is again presumed valid.69 If the PTO
a reexamination, an examiner may not reject a claim based solely on prior art cited in the
initial examination); M.P.E.P., supra note 18, § 2258.01.
63. Bruning v. Hirose, 161 F.3d 681, 685 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Laitram Corp. v. NEC
Corp., 952 F.2d 1357, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1991), rev'd, 62 F.3d 1388 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Etter, 756
F.2d at 856 (holding that the reexamination is intended to be neutral).
64. Laitram, 952 F.2d at 1360 ("Reexamination provides a mechanism ... to review
and correct an initial examination. Thus reexamination is conducted afresh, without the
burdens and presumptions that accompany litigation of an issued patent." (footnote
omitted)); Etter, 756 F.2d at 857-58.
65. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427 (Fed. Cir. 1988); In re Caveney, 761
F.2d 671, 674 (Fed. Cir. 1985). Because the PTO has already determined that a substantial
new question of patentability exists, it is likely that the PTO will reject one or more claims
in a first office action. SCHECTER & THOMAS, supra note 16, § 19.6.4.1.
66. 35 U.S.C. § 305.
67. Id.; see also Portola Packaging, 110 F.3d at 791 ("It is clear that the scope of a
patent claim may not be enlarged by amendment during reexamination.").
68. 35 U.S.C. § 307(a). At the conclusion of the reexamination proceeding, the
Director issues a Certificate of Patentability (or Unpatentability) "canceling any claim of
the patent finally determined to be unpatentable, confirming any claim of the patent
determined to be patentable, and incorporating in the patent any proposed amended or
new claim determined to be patentable." Id.
69. Id. § 307(a); see also SCHECTER & THOMAS, supra note 16, § 19.6.4.1. Those
claims that survive reexamination are subject to the doctrine of intervening rights, which
protects third parties who relied on the wording of the claims of the original patent before
it was amended. 35 U.S.C. §§ 252, 307(b). The Federal Circuit has applied the doctrine as
follows:
Claims amended during reexamination are entitled to the date of the original
patent if they are without substantive change or are legally "identical" to the
claims in the original patent. If not "identical," the patentee has no right to
recover infringement damages for periods prior to the date that the
reexamination certificate issued.
Tennant Co. v. Hako Minuteman, Inc., 878 F.2d 1413, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1989). In addition,
courts may authorize continued practice of the claimed invention "to the extent and under
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determines that the claims are unpatentable, the PTO issues a certificate
canceling the claims, and the claims become unenforceable.7 °
As with an initial examination, a patent owner may appeal an
examiner's decision to the PTO's Board of Patent Appeals or, if that
fails, bring a civil suit in federal court.71 However, in an ex parte
reexamination, a third-party requester has no right to appeal the
examiner's decision-only the patent owner may appeal.72
More recently, Congress adopted an additional inter partes
reexamination procedure that allows limited participation by a thirdparty requester. 73 The procedure for filing a request and the procedure
for ordering a reexamination are essentially the same as the ex parte
reexamination procedures.74 Although the record of the reexamination is
limited to patents and printed publications, the inter partes
reexamination allows a third-party requester to participate in the
reexamination beyond the initial submission. 75
However, challengers do not frequently utilize the inter partes
reexamination procedure. 76 This is in part because the inter partes
such terms as the court deems equitable for the protection of investments made or
business commenced before the grant of the [reexamination]." 35 U.S.C. § 252.
70. 35 U.S.C. § 307(a).
71. Id. §§ 134, 141, 145, 306.
72. See id.; In re Opprecht, 868 F.2d 1264, 1265-66 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (denying the
motion of an alleged third-party infringer to intervene or file an amicus curiae in the
patent owner's appeal from an adverse decision in reexamination). Generally, third
parties may not intervene in appeals. Id. at 1265. While the Federal Circuit acknowledged
that the court has discretion to grant a request for intervention, it concluded that mere
interest in the outcome is insufficient to support intervention. Id. at 1266. Compare id.,
with In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1091-93 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (permitting intervention
by a third party who protested a prior reissue of the patent, and was party in related
litigation), and Reed v. Quigg, No. 85-2762, 1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25538, at *3-4, *10-11,
230 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 62, 63, 65 (D.D.C. May 13, 1986) (permitting intervention by third
party who had a sufficiently protectable interest and agreed to limit his intervention to
patents and publications).
73. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999 (AIPA), 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2000).
Congress passed the AIPA, Title IV of S. 1948, as part of the Intellectual Property and
Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999. Pub. L. No. 106-113 app. I, 113 Stat.
1501A-521, 1501A-552 (1999); see also Intellectual Property and High Technology
Technical Amendments Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1901.
74. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-313. Like ex parte reexamination, the requester must
present evidence of prior art in the form of patents and printed publications. Id. §§ 301,
311.
75. See id. § 314 ("Each time that the patent owner files a response to an action ...
the third-party requester shall have one opportunity to file written comments addressing
issues raised by the action of the Office or the patent owner's response thereto.").
76. James Hanft, Reexamination as an Alternative to Litigation, CORP. COUNS. (Law
Journal Newsletters, Phila., Pa.), Aug. 26, 2004, at 1, 5 (noting that twenty-three inter
partes requests were filed in 2004; for the years 2001, 2002, 2003, inter partes filings totaled
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reexamination procedure is only available to challenge patents filed after
November 29, 1999."7 In addition, inter partes reexamination includes an
estoppel provision requiring the requesting party to waive his right to
litigate any issues that were raised or could have been raised before the
PTO. 78 Finally, an adjudicated infringer may not request an inter partes
reexamination to challenge a patent if the request is based on issues he
raised or could have raised in a prior civil action. 7 9
In summary, Congress has granted concurrent power to both the PTO
and the federal district courts to invalidate patents. 0 However, parties
may not avail themselves of one or more these proceedings if barred by
the doctrine of res judicata, and, more particularly, collateral estoppel.

one, four, and twenty-one, respectively); M. Patricia Thayer et al., Examining
Reexamination: Not Yet an Antidote to Litigation, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 23 n.2 (2004)
(noting that from January 1999 through October, 2003, only twenty-eight inter partes
reexamination requests were filed); Frederick C. Williams, Giving Inter Partes Patent
Reexamination a Chance To Work, 32 AIPLA Q.J. 265, 278-79 (2004).
77. Thayer et al., supra note 76, at 23 n.2.
78. 35 U.S.C. § 315. As the statute notes:
A third-party requester ... is estopped from asserting at a later time, in any
civil action . . . the invalidity of any claim finally determined to be valid and
patentable on any ground which the third-party requester raised or could have
raised during the inter partes reexamination proceedings. This subsection does
not prevent the assertion of invalidity based on newly discovered prior art
unavailable to the third-party requester and the Patent and Trademark Office at
the time of the inter partes reexamination proceedings.
Id. During a 2004 roundtable discussion, witnesses expressed concerns about the estoppel
provision, claiming it "dampens the enthusiasm of the patent bar for this new proceeding."
Patent and Trademark Office/Interferences: Patent PractitionersCite Ongoing Inequities in
PTO System for Challenging Issued Patents, 67 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA)
365, 366 (Feb. 27, 2004). The witnesses identified other weaknesses in the procedure,
including the "inability to conduct meaningful discovery and to cross-examine a
declarant," as well as the restricted bases for initiating a reexamination proceeding. Id.
As a result, the PTO proposed a new postgrant review process, submitted to Congress in
February 2002. See PTO Reexamination Report, 69 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 204, 208 (Dec. 24, 2004).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 317(b). Section 317 specifies that
[o]nce a final decision has been entered against a party in a civil action
arising in whole or in part under section 1338 of title 28, United States Code, that
the party has not sustained its burden of proving the invalidity of any patent
claim in suit ... then neither that party nor its privies may thereafter request an
inter partes reexamination of any such patent claim on the basis of issues which
that party or its privies raised or could have raised in such civil action ....
Id.
80. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 301,311.
81. See discussion infra Part III.
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III.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL

As with any final judgment, after a district court rules on validity and
infringement, it may not reopen the case.82 Thus, a losing party has
limited alternatives to challenge the judgment. 83 One option is that a
losing party may make a posttrial motion for a new trial, or for relief
from the judgment."s Another option is direct appeal-either party may
appeal to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit."' Beyond these
82. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982) ("A valid and final
personal judgment is conclusive between the parties, except on appeal or other direct
review .... "); see also id. § 18 ("When a valid and final personal judgment is rendered in
favor of the plaintiff ... [t~he plaintiff cannot thereafter maintain an action on the original
claim or any part thereof .... ).
83. See Jamesbury Corp. v. Litton Indus. Prods., Inc., 839 F.2d 1544, 1550 (Fed. Cir.
1988).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 59 (motion for new trial); id. 60(b) (motion for relief from the
judgment). If the losing party believes that there were errors in the trial process, or
serious errors in a jury verdict, a losing party may move for a new trial. See id. 59;
Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 953 F.2d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1991)
(holding that a new trial is warranted if the verdict is against the "clear or great weight of
the evidence"); Whalen v. Roanoke County Bd. of Supervisors, 769 F.2d 221, 226 (4th Cir.
1985) (indicating that a court should grant a motion for new trial where '"required in
order to prevent injustice' (quoting 11 CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2805, at 38 (1973))); Goldsmith v. Diamond
Shamrock Corp., 767 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1985) (stating that to grant a new trial the
verdict must be "against the 'clear weight,' 'overwhelming weight,' or 'great weight' of the
evidence"); Lind v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 278 F.2d 79, 89 (3d Cir. 1960) (granting motion
for new trial where result was "seriously erroneous"); JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE 433-36 (4th ed. 2001). A court may relieve the party from the judgment if,
for example, there is a mistake or newly discovered evidence that could not have been
introduced in time for a motion for a new trial, or there is evidence of fraud or
misrepresentations committed by the opposing party, or the law upon which the judgment
is based has changed. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b); Norman H. Zivin & Wendy E. Miller, An
Overview of a Patent Law Suit and the Decision To File, in 1 PATENT LITIGATION 1991, at
87, 144 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series
No. 320, 1991). A Rule 59 motion is to be filed no later than ten days after entry of
judgment. FED. R. Civ. P. 59. A party must make a Rule 60(b) motion within a
reasonable time, and not more than a year after the final judgment in the case of mistake,
newly discovered evidence, or fraud. Id. 60(b).
85. 28 U.S.C. § 1295; see also Marsh v. Austin-Fort Worth Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
744 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (5th Cir. 1984). The Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over any case arising under any patent law. 28 U.S.C. § 1295; see also
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (noting that Congress
created the Federal Circuit in order to bring uniformity and certainty to the resolution of
patent disputes). However, only parties adversely affected by the judgment may appeal.
Jamesbury, 839 F.2d at 1550. Another option available to a losing party is a collateral
attack on the judgment, such as an action to set aside a prior judgment. Zivin & Miller,
supra note 84, at 146. However, this is usually unsuccessful because under the doctrines of
collateral estoppel and res judicata, the parties are barred from relitigating issues
previously decided. See discussion infra Part III.A. A party may appeal issues of validity
and infringement, but that party must have raised the appealed issue before the district
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options, the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel preclude
litigants from relitigating issues, favoring the finality of the judgment. 6
A. CollateralEstoppel Prevents Some Partiesfrom Relitigatingthe Issue
of Patent Validity

With respect to judicial proceedings, the principle of collateral
estoppel, also known as issue preclusion, prevents parties from
87
relitigating issues that a court has already decided . Federal courts apply
collateral estoppel when four requirements are met:
"(1) the issue at stake is identical to the one involved in the
prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated in the prior
proceeding; (3) the determination of the issue in the prior
litigation must have been a 'critical and necessary part' of the
judgment in the first action; and (4) the party against whom
collateral estoppel is asserted must have had a full and fair

opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceedng.
Regarding the first requirement of collateral estoppel, the federal
courts construe the identicality requirement broadly with respect to
patent validity, stating that collateral estoppel bars in the later
proceeding all arguments pertaining to the patent's validity that were
actually raised, or that could have been raised, in the earlier proceeding."'
The second requirement- that the issue was actually litigated in the
prior proceeding-is satisfied "'if the parties to the original action
disputed the issue and the trier of fact resolved it."'9°
The third requirement-that the resolution of the issue was a critical
and necessary part of the previous judgment-seeks to prevent issue
preclusion on the basis of an incidental determination of a nonessential
9
respectand
to patent
infringement,
issue
earlier
necessary
part of aa
a critical
of decision.
validity ' is With
court'sin the
finding

court. See, e.g., Am. Gen. Fin. Corp. v. Parkway Bank & Trust Co., 520 F.2d 607, 608 (8th
Cir. 1975).
86. Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 107-08 (1991); S. Pac.
R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1897).
87. See Solimino, 501 U.S. at 107-08; S. Pac. R. R., 168 U.S. at 48-49.
88. Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (quoting
Pleming v. Universal-Rundle Corp., 142 F.3d 1354, 1359 (11th Cir. 1998)).
89. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I1l. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971)
(validity); Dana, 342 F.3d at 1321 (validity and infringement); Mother's Rest. Inc. v.
Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
90. Mother's Rest., 723 F.2d at 1570 (quoting Cont'l Can Co. v. Marshall, 603 F.2d
500, 596 (7th Cir. 1979)).
91. Id. at 1571. Some courts have held that this does not necessarily require that the
prior judgment relied upon resolution of the issue. See, e.g., id.
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determination of liability because an infringer cannot be liable for
infringing an invalid claim.92
As to the fourth requirement, the courts generally hold that a party has
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate an issue when a prior court
proceeding has resulted in a final judgment on that issue.93 Courts may
find exceptions to this rule, however, if there is a reason to doubt the
quality, extensiveness, or fairness of procedures followed in the prior
litigation.94 But generally, a district court's judgment is final and retains
its preclusive effect, even during the pendency of an appeal.9
Traditionally, only the original litigants were affected by collateral
estoppel.96 However, in the context of patent invalidity, the Supreme
Court approved the use of "nonmutual" collateral estoppel. 9 In other
words, after a court holds that a patent is invalid, the patent owner is
collaterally estopped from subsequently enforcing the invalid patent
against another party. 9 On the other hand, when a court holds that a
patent is not invalid, this determination is not binding on either the
patent owner or subsequent defendants. 99 Consequently, the validity of a
patent may be challenged by another defendant in another lawsuit until a
court finally holds that the patent is invalid.1 0
B. CollateralEstoppel Applies to Administrative Proceedings
It is generally accepted that the principles of collateral estoppel apply
to administrative proceedings as well as judicial proceedings.'
Administrative agencies have applied collateral estoppel to quasi-judicial
proceedings to preclude a party from raising an issue that a federal court
92. Richdel, Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 714 F.2d 1573, 1579-80 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
93. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163-64 & 164 n.11 (1979).
94. Id.
95. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed.
Cir. 1999) ("'[Tjhe law is well settled that the pendency of an appeal has no effect on the
finality or binding effect of a trial court's holding."' (alteration in original) (quoting SSIH
Equip. S.A. v. U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 718 F.2d 365, 370 (Fed. Cir. 1983))).

96.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS

97.

See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I11.Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971).

§ 27 & cmt. a (1982).

98. See id. However, the patent owner may proceed with a subsequent action by
proving that he was denied a full and fair opportunity to litigate in the first action. See id.

at 332-34.
99. Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
100. See Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
("Thereupon, the patent simply remains valid until another challenger carries the § 282
burden.").
101. See, e.g., Graybill v. U.S. Postal Serv., 782 F.2d 1567, 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1986)
(invoking collateral estoppel to preclude a postal employee convicted of a crime from
rearguing his innocence before the Merit Systems Protection Board).
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has already decided. 2 The federal courts tend to justify application of
collateral estoppel to quasi-judicial agency proceedings on the basis that
the doctrine's underlying principles of judicial efficiency and finality of
judgments also apply to administrative proceedings. 1 3 The Federal
Circuit has applied principles of collateral estoppel to the PTO, and more
specifically, to ex parte reexamination proceedings.' °4 For example,
where a federal court holds a patent invalid, the PTO applies collateral
estoppel to preclude a patent owner from requesting ex parte
reexamination of the invalid patent.05
In summary, application of collateral estoppel to findings of patent
validity yields several general rules.1°6 The PTO's finding that a patent is
102. See, e.g., id.
103. See id. (citing Chisholm v. Def. Logistics Agency, 656 F.2d 42, 46 (3d Cir. 1981));
cf. United States v. Utah Constr. & Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966) ("When an
administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of fact
properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate, the
courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose."). See generally 2
RICHARD J. PIERCE. JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 13.4 (4th ed. 2002).

104. See, e.g., In re Freeman, 30 F.3d 1459, 1465-67 (Fed. Cir. 1994). In Freeman, the
Federal Circuit held that collateral estoppel applied in an ex parte reexamination
proceeding to bar the patent owner from asserting a claim interpretation that differed
from the district court's prior claim construction ruling. Id. at 1467. The patentee argued
that estoppel should not apply because procedural opportunities were available to the
patentee that were not available during litigation, but the court rejected this argument,
stating that "application of the doctrine of issue preclusion is not precluded on the basis of
any procedural opportunity available in the PTO and not available in the district court."
Id. at 1469; see also Marlow Indus., Inc. v. Igloo Prods. Corp., 65 F. App'x 313, 319 (Fed.
Cir. 2003) (holding district court's claim construction as binding on the PTO in later ex
parte reexamination; patentee committed inequitable conduct by failing to provide the
Office with court's claim construction orders). In Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422
(Fed. Cir. 1998), the Federal Circuit noted that the PTO is bound by a court's decision that
a patent is invalid. Id. at 1426. The court addressed the issue of whether the
Commissioner had the authority to stay a timely-filed ex parte reexamination request by a
third party pending the outcome of litigation involving the same patent. Id. The Federal
Circuit concluded that the Commissioner lacked authority to stay the reexamination
because a stay was not consistent with the congressional intent that the reexamination
proceeding "provide an efficient and relatively inexpensive procedure for reviewing the
validity of patents which would employ the PTO's expertise." Id. The court further noted
that "if a court finds a patent invalid, and that decision is either upheld on appeal or not
appealed, the PTO may discontinue its reexamination." Id. at 1429.
105. See M.P.E.P., supra note 18, § 2242(III)(C) ("A final holding of claim invalidity or
unenforceability... is controlling on the Office."); see also id. § 2286. The PTO will deny
an ex parte request fo: reexamination if a court has issued a final ruling of invalidity
because "[i]n such cases a substantial new question of patentability would not be present
as to the claims finally held invalid or unenforceable." Id. § 2242(Ili)(C). If a court issues
a final ruling of invalidity after the PTO has granted reexamination, the "reexamination
will be terminated." Id. § 2286(IV).
106. See Allen M. Leung, Legal Judo: Strategic Applications of Reexamination Versus
an Aggressive Adversary (Part I), 84 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 471, 484-86
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unpatentable is binding on the patent owner in pending and future
litigation. 7 Likewise, a court's determination that a patent is invalid is
binding on both litigants in pending and future litigation.'0 8 It is also
binding on the patent owner in concurrent or future reexamination
°9 In
proceedings conducted by the PTO.'
contrast, the PTO's finding of
patentability does not necessarily bind the patent owner or alleged
infringer in subsequent litigation."0 Finally, a court's final judgment that
a patent is not invalid has a binding effect only on a defendant who has
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate validity-it does not have a
binding effect on the patent owner in future litigation or in proceedings
before the PTO."'
(2002); Ernest H. Schopler, Annotation, Modern Status of Federal Rules of Res Judicata
in Patent Litigation, 4 A.L.R. FED. 181, § 5[b]-[c] (1970).
107. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of I11.
Found., 402 U.S. 313, 349-50
(1971).
108. Id. at 334. In Blonder-Tongue, the Supreme Court held that a patent owner was
estopped from asserting a claim of patent infringement against a new defendant where the
patent was held invalid in an earlier litigation involving a first defendant. Id. at 333-34.
The Supreme Court held that "once the claims of a patent are held invalid in a suit
involving one alleged infringer, an unrelated party who is sued for infringement of those
claims may reap the benefit of the invalidity decision under the principles of collateral
estoppel." Mendenhall v. Barber-Greene Co., 26 F.3d 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir.) (summarizing
the Supreme Court's holding in Blonder-Tongue), amended by No. 91-11-9, 1994 U.S.
App. LEXIS. 26588 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 14, 1994).
109. See Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1428-29 ("[I]f a court finds a patent invalid, and that
decision is either upheld on appeal or not appealed, the PTO may discontinue its
reexamination."); M.P.E.P., supra note 18, § 2286(IV) ("Upon the issuance of a final
holding of invalidity or unenforceability, the claims held invalid or unenforceable will be
withdrawn from consideration in the reexamination. . . . If all of the claims in the
reexamination proceeding are finally held invalid or unenforceable, the reexamination will
be vacated by the [Technology Center] Director as no longer containing a substantial new
question of patentability and the reexamination will be terminated.").
110. See Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1429. Although courts must weigh the examiner's
decision in the reexamination, their proceedings are based on a different record and
standard of review, and therefore the court may reach a different result. Id. at 1428-29.
111. Id. at 1429 n.3 ("[A] court's decision upholding a patent's validity is not ordinarily
binding on another challenge to the patent's validity.., in either the courts or the PTO.");
Marchon Eyewear, Inc. v. Tura L.P., No. 98 CV 1932(SJ), 1999 WL 184107, at *3
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1999) (estopping a defendant from asserting the invalidity of a patent
in a lawsuit related to a second product, where in previous lawsuit he contended that the
patent-in-suit was invalid); see also Allen Archery, Inc. v. Browning Mfg. Co., 819 F.2d
1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (holding that "[t]he statutory presumption of patent validity..
• 'is not augmented by an earlier adjudication of patent "validity .....
(citation omitted)
(quoting Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984))); Tensar
Corp. v. Tenax Corp., Civ. No. H-91-1460, 1992 WL 443904, at *1-2, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1314, 1315 (D. Md. Oct. 16, 1992); In re Eis, 1 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1418, 1419-20 (Comm'r
Pat. & Trademarks 1986) (proceeding with a reexamination of a patent previously held
not invalid by a district court). In Ethicon, the Federal Circuit recognized that while
collateral estoppel does not bar "another's challenge" to the patent, it does bar a party to
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The PTO and the federal district courts may independently reach
contradictory conclusions on the issue of a patent's validity.12 Therefore,
it is worthwhile to consider the respective weight of each conclusion,
based on the power and relationship of the coordinate branches of the
federal government. ,13
IV. SEPARATION OF POWERS AS APPLIED TO
COURTS

PTO AND FEDERAL

A. Separation of Powers Prohibitsa DirectAdministrative Review of a
JudicialDecision
The Constitution empowers the executive branch of the federal
government to execute the laws of the United States," 4 a power that is
The PTO is an
enabled by various administrative agencies. " '
administrative agency, created by Congress and situated within the
Department of Commerce.116 As an administrative agency, the PTO's
powers are as broad as those delegated by Congress in the agency's

enabling statute."' Beyond the powers expressly delegated by Congress,
the PTO is limited by the powers granted to the coordinate branches of
the federal government." 8 One of the fundamental limitations on an
agency's power is the prohibition of administrative review of Article III
court decisions. 1 9

the litigation after final judgment. Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1429 n.3 (quoting Panduit Corp. v.
Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1570 (Fed. Cir. 1987)).
112. Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1428.
113. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-B.
114. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
115. 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) (2000) ("'[A]gency' means each authority of the Government of
the United States ... but does not include ... the Congress [or] the courts of the United
States ... "); 73 C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure§ 18 (2004).

116. See 35 U.S.C. § 1 (2000) ("The United States Patent and Trademark Office is
established as an agency of the United States, within the Department of Commerce.").
117. See Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 291 U.S. 587, 598
(1934). Beyond administrative powers, an agency may also legislate and adjudicate, but
only as authorized by Congress. See, e.g., Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S.
212, 222-23 (1989) (upholding congressional delegation of taxing power); Mistretta v.
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (upholding congressional delegation of the power
to issue binding sentencing guidelines); Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. Co., 305 U.S.
177, 181-82 (1938) (upholding administrative adjudication in railroad regulation);
Zakonaite v. Wolf, 226 U.S. 272, 275 (1912) (holding that Congress can authorize agencies
to adjudicate cases involving aliens).
118.

See 2 AM. JUR. 2D Administrative Law § 62 (2004).

119. See, e.g., Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14
(1948); United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 49-52 (1852); Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 DalI.) 409,410 n.t (1792).
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A federal district court derives its power from Article III of the
Constitution, which allocates the judicial power of the United States to
"one Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.', 20 The Constitution empowers
Article III courts to decide cases or controversies. 121 While the duty of
the judicial branch is to interpret and apply the law, 22 an Article III court
may not render advisory opinions.
As such, another branch of
government may not review a judgment entered by an Article III court,
otherwise the court's decision would be merely advisory. 2
Consequently, review of federal court decisions must remain within the
federal judiciary. 2 1 Only a federal court of appeals or the Supreme
Court may review a federal district court's judgment and only the
26
Supreme Court may review the judgment of a federal court of appeals.
The Supreme Court "is the tribunal which is ultimately to decide all
judicial questions confided to the Government of the United States. No
appeal is given from its decisions, nor any power given to27the legislative
or executive departments to interfere with its judgments.'
Although Congress has limited power to alter the jurisdiction of
Article III Courts, the Supreme Court has held that Congress cannot
"prescribe a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way, 1 28 nor
may Congress, consistent with constitutional principles, provide for
executive branch review of a judicial determination. 129 Article III courts,
therefore, "render no judgments not binding and conclusive on the
parties and none that are subject to later review or alteration by
administrative action."' 30 An administrative agency may disregard a
court's judgment only if the court was not authorized to render it. 131

120. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
121. Id. art. III, § 2, cl.
1.
122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 127, 177 (1803).
123. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991); Muskrat v. United
States, 219 U.S. 346, 360-62 (1911); Ferreira,54 U.S. (13 How.) at 51-52; Hayburn's Case, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) at 410 n.t.
124. See, e.g., Ferreira,54 U.S. (13 How.) at 49-52.
125. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1253-1254, 1291-1292, 1295 (2000).
126. Id.
127. Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697, 700 (1864).
128. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145-47 (1872).
129. Id. (refusing to give effect to a proviso that prescribed to the judiciary the effect
to be given to a Presidential pardon); see also United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians,
448 U.S. 371,402-05 (1980); Chi. & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 11314 (1948); Ferreira,54 U.S. (13 How.) at 49-52; Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410
n.t (1792).
130. Waterman S.S., 333 U.S. at 113-14.

131. See id.
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agency such as the PTO is without

authority to overturn or ignore a federal court judgment. 32
B. JudicialReview of Administrative Actions
While administrative agencies may not review judicial decisions,
judicial review of administrative action is vital to the integrity of our
government, preserving the proper function of the judicial branch. 33
However, while judicial review is generally favored, not all

administrative

actions

expressly

or impliedly

legislation.

'

are reviewable.134
grant

Rather, Congress must

a right to judicial

review

through

The PTO's patentability determinations are but one

example of judicially reviewable administrative actions-Congress
empowered the Federal Circuit to directly review the PTO's decis3ons.
In addition, the United States Code empowers the federal district courts
to adjudicate patentability and validity disputes.137
In reviewing the PTO's patentability decisions, the Federal Circuit
applies a deferential "substantial evidence" standard, 3 " set forth in the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA).139 However, this standard is less
deferential than the standard of review applied by a district court to a
patent validity dispute, where a patent enjoys a presumption of validity
that a challenger
may only overcome with clear and convincing evidence
• .
140
of invalidity.
Despite conflicting standards, the courts have not yet
determined whether the APA standard will supplant the clear and
convincing standard for questions of validity141

132. See id. at 113. The Supreme Court held that "[j]udgments within the powers
vested in the courts by the Judiciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be
revised, overturned or refused full faith and credit by another Department of
Government." Id.
133. ROBERT L. HARMON, PATENTS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT § 21.1, at 1185 (6th
ed. 2003).
134. See id.
135. See id.
136. 35 U.S.C. § 141 (2000).
This applies to both original examinations and
reexaminations. Id. §§ 141, 306, 315.
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (2000); 35 U.S.C. §§ 145,282.
138. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2000); see also Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999).
139. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344,4301,5335, 5372, 7521.
140. See id. § 706; 35 U.S.C. § 282; see, e.g., Buildex, Inc. v. Kason Indus., Inc., 849 F.2d
1461, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 138
(Fed. Cir. 1986); RCA Corp. v. Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc., 730 F.2d 1440, 1444 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
141. See, e.g., Superior Fireplace Co. v. Majestic Prods. Co., 270 F.3d 1358, 1367-68
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (declining to address whether the APA standards of appellate review
supplant the clear and convincing standard as "a complex question that the parties have
not fully briefed"). The Federal Circuit felt that "[gliven the importance of this APA issue
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C. JudicialDeference to PTO Actions

Beyond the initial examination, the PTO does not have exclusive
jurisdiction over the matter of patent validity, but as indicated above
courts still generally defer to the expertise of the PTO. 4 One of the
main purposes of the reexamination statute is to allow the courts to
benefit from the PTO's expertise.14 ' Accordingly, courts have recognized
1
that a reexamination confirming patentability is evidence of validity. "
and its prominence in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Dickinson v. Zurko we
expect that it will resurface 'in a case in which the decision will turn on that [issue]."' Id.
at 1368 (second alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560,1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995)).
142. See Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir.
1988) (holding that Congress was acting within its constitutional powers when it delegated
power to the courts to adjudicate validity of patents and when it created a concurrent
administrative mechanism for the review of patents via the reexamination procedure);
Brunswick Corp. v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261, 270 (7th Cir. 1984) (stating that the
"validity of a patent is a question of law, which a court decides with some but not great
deference to decisions of the Patent Office"); Johnson & Johnson, Inc. v. Wallace A.
Erickson & Co., 627 F.2d 57, 61 (7th Cir. 1980) (holding that a court has the power to
invalidate a patent independent of the PTO's determination in a reissue proceeding). The
last two cases refer to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, which is an administrative
theory concerned with the proper distribution of authority between administrative
agencies and the judicial system. See United States v. W. Pac. R.R. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 63
(1956). The doctrine of primary jurisdiction permits a court to suspend the judicial
process in order to refer an issue to an agency that has "special competence." Id. at 64.
There are traditionally two situations in which courts will invoke the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction. See RCA Corp., 467 F. Supp. at 101. Courts will use the doctrine when (1)
there is "a perceived need for uniformity in regulation" and (2) "in situations where that
agency had some kind of expertise which would be otherwise unavailable to a court." Id.
Courts have held that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to the review of
the validity of patents. See, e.g., Brunswick, 752 F.2d at 270; Johnson & Johnson, 627 F.2d
at 61. Courts have generally recognized that "[w]hile the expertise of the PTO might well
be of assistance . . . the PTO is not 'uniquely qualified' to pass on the validity of the
patent." RCA Corp., 467 F. Supp. at 103. However, courts will generally defer to the PTO
expertise, as exemplified by the statutory presumption of validity for issued patents. See,
e.g., Nat'l Bus. Sys. v. AM Int'l, Inc., 743 F.2d 1227, 1232 (7th Cir. 1984) (citing Parker v.
Motorola Inc., 524 F.2d 518, 521 (5th Cir. 1975) and Chi. Rawhide Mfg. Co. v. Crane
Packing Co., 523 F.2d 452, 458 (7th Cir. 1975)). Accordingly, courts will defer to the
expertise of the PTO with respect to the results of a patent reexamination. See Ethicon v.
Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
143. See Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983) ("[O]ne
purpose of the reexamination procedure is to eliminate trial of that issue (when the claim
is canceled) or to facilitate trial of that issue by providing the district court with the expert
view of the PTO (when a claim survives the reexamination proceeding).").
144. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 955, 961 (Fed.
Cir. 1986) (holding that where the prior art introduced at trial is the same as that
presented to the PTO in a reexamination, a district court, in considering patent invalidity,
must give credence to a reexamination proceeding that upholds the validity of the patent
claims); Ralph Gonnocci Revocable Living Trust v. Three M Tool & Mach., Inc., No. 0274796, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24423, at *13, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1755, 1759 (E.D. Mich.
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In order for the courts to benefit from the PTO's expertise, Congress
allows the district courts to liberally grant stays while the PTO
reexamines a patent-in-suit.1 4 5 In exercising its discretion, a federal
district court conducts a balancing test to determine whether to grant a
The test weighs the
stay until the PTO reaches a final decision. 14
benefits of staying the litigation against the burdens associated with the
delay. 4 7 Among the factors considered are: (1) whether the stay unduly

Oct. 7, 2003) ("Although not binding on this Court, the PTO's decision will be admissible
and carries a presumption of validity."); Steven M. Auvil, Note, Staying Patent Validity
Litigation Pending Reexamination: When Should Courts Endeavor To Do So?, 41 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 315, 327 (1993) ("Although not binding, a decision by the Patent Office
upholding the validity of reexamined patent claims is strong evidence that a district court
must consider in assessing whether the party asserting invalidity has met its burden .... ").
But see Amphenol T&M Antennas Inc. v. Centurion Int'l Inc., No. 00 C 4298, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 822, at *4-5, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798, 1800 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2002)
(holding that evidence that a patent will be reexamined is barred because it is of little
probative value and may be highly prejudicial to the issue of validity).
145. Gould, 705 F.2d at 1342. Congress did not expressly provide for a stay of
litigation pending the outcome of an ex parte reexamination proceeding. See 35 U.S.C. §§
301-307. Rather, Congress approved of the district courts' use of discretion when granting
stays. See, e.g., Gould, 705 F.2d at 1342; Softview Computer Prods. Corp. v. Haworth, Inc.,
No. 97 CIV. 8815 KMW HBP, 2000 WL 1134471, at *2, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633, 1635
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000) (finding that although the statute does not expressly provide for
stays, the court has the discretion to grant them); GPAC, Inc. v. D.W.W. Enters., Inc., 144
F.R.D. 60, 62, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1129, 1131 (D.N.J. 1992) ("Congress noted its
); Robert H. Harris Co. v. Metal
approval of district courts liberally granting stays ....
Mfg. Co., Civ. No. J-C-90-179, 1991 WL 217666, at *3, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1786, 1788
(E.D. Ark. Jun. 21, 1991) ("The legislative history surrounding the establishment of the
reexamination proceeding evinces congressional approval of district courts liberally
granting stays."); Ingro v. Tyco Indus., Inc., No. 84 C 10844, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19300,
at *9, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 69, 71 (N.D. Ill. May 31, 1985) ("[L]egislative history indicates
Congress and the testifying witnesses approved of courts liberally granting stays within
their discretion."); cf 35 U.S.C. § 318 (granting statutory right to a stay of litigation once
an inter partes reexamination is initiated unless the court determines that "a stay would
not serve the interests of justice"). Without the ability to stay litigation, federal courts
could not preserve the purpose of reexamination. Gould, 705 F.2d at 1342.
146. See, e.g., Middleton, Inc. v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., No. 4:03-CV-40493, 2004
WL 198669, at *3 (S.D. Iowa Aug. 24, 2004); Softview Computer Prods., 2000 WL 1134471,
at *3, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635-36; Emhart Indus., Inc. v. Sankyo Seiki Mfg. Co., No.
85 C 7565, 1987 WL 6314, at *2, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1889 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 30, 1987).
147. See Middleton, 2004 WL 198669, at *3. Among the advantages of staying
proceedings pending the outcome of a reexamination are:
1. All prior art presented to the Court will have been first considered by the
PTO, with its particular expertise.
2. Many discovery problems relating to prior art can be alleviated by the
PTO examination.
3. In those cases resulting in effective invalidity of the patent, the suit will
likely be dismissed.
4. The outcome of the reexamination may encourage a settlement without
the further use of the Court.
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prejudices the non-moving party; (2) whether the reexamination could
simplify issues in litigation; and (3) at what stage of litigation the motion
is filed. If the court determines that the benefits outweigh the burdens,
then it will grant the motion for stay.149
Courts give particular weight to the third factor, which considers the
stage of litigation when the stay is requested. 150 Although, in theory, the
PTO conducts ex parte reexaminations with "special dispatch," the
reexamination and appeals process frequently takes more than a year."'

5. The record of reexamination would likely be entered at trial, thereby
reducing the complexity and length of the litigation.
6. Issues, defenses, and evidence will be more easily limited in pretrial
conferences after a reexamination.
7. The cost will likely be reduced both for the parties and the Court.
Emhart, 1987 WL 6314, at *1-2, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (quoting Fisher Controls Co.
v. Control Components Inc., 443 F. Supp. 581, 582 (S.D. Iowa 1977)).
148. Werre v. Battenfeld Techs., Inc., No. Civ. 03-1471-AA, 2004 WL 2554568, at *1
(D. Or. Nov. 9, 2004); Softview Computer Prods., 2000 WL 1134471, at *2-3, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1635-36 (quoting Xerox Corp. v. 3Com Corp., 69 F. Supp. 2d 404, 406
(W.D.N.Y. 1999)); see also Auvil, supra note 144, at 331 (observing that the factors
considered by the courts include: "(1) the technical expertise of the Patent Office; (2) the
probable effect on the litigation that granting a stay would have; (3) the stage of the
litigation at which the motion was filed; and (4) the adequacy of the patent owner's legal
remedy"). Generally, the courts recognize that reexamination may eliminate many issues
in the pending litigation. Middleton, 2004 WL 196889, at *3. Even if the claims are not
found invalid, the reexamination may result in narrowing of the scope of the patent, which
simplifies the issues before the court. See, e.g., Werre, 2004 WL 2554568, at *1; Loffland
Bros. Co. v. Mid-Western Energy Corp., No. CIV-83-2255-E, 1985 WL 1483, at *2, 225
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 886, 887 (W.D. Okla. Jan. 3,1985). In addition, the technical expertise of
the PTO will help the Court in addressing any remaining issues. See Middleton, 2004 WL
1968669, at *3; Harris, 1991 WL 217666, at *3, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
149. See, e.g., Middleton, 2004 WL 1968669, at *10; Sofiview Computer Prods., 2000
WL 1134471, at *3, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1636; GPAC, 144 F.R.D. at 65-66, 23
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1134; Harris, 1991 WL 217666, at *4, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789;
Brown v. Shimano Am. Corp., No. CV 88-6565 WJR (BX), 1991 WL 133586, at *1, 18
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1496, 1496 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 1991); see also, Auvil, supra note 144, at
331. One district court granted a partial stay, concluding that while the advantages of a
stay outweigh the disadvantages, a partial stay could address the concerns of both parties.
In re Laughlin Prods., Inc., 265 F. Supp. 2d 525, 538 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (order granting
motion to stay proceedings in part). The partial stay was designed to end on "the earlierof
December 1, 2003, or the PTO's issuance of a reexamination certificate." Id.
150. See, e.g., Emhart, 1987 WL 6314, at *3-4, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891-92.
151. Xerox, 69 F. Supp. 2d at 406 n.1. ("[Sitatistics. . . show that the average pendency
of re-examination before the PTO is 19.2 months not including any appeal."); Toro Co. v.
L.R. Nelson Corp., No. 81-1019, 1984 WL 1244, at *2, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 636, 637 (C.D.
IIl. July 25, 1984) (stating defendant's argument that a reexamination proceeding could
delay proceedings for a period of several years when factoring in time for appeal);
Motsenbocker, supra note 13, at 894.
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This delay can be problematic if the litigation has reached a stage
where
52
the parties and the courts have expended significant resources.1
Filing the motion to stay in the earlier stages of the litigation weighs in
favor of granting the motion and suspending proceedings to await the
results of the reexamination.' If, however, the stay is sought at a later
point in litigation, factors such as whether significant discovery or trial
preparation have taken place weigh heavily
in favor of denying the
54
motion and proceeding with the litigation.'
152. See Enprotech Corp. v. Autotech Corp., No. 88 C 4853, 1990 WL 37217, at *2, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1320 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 16, 1990) (denying a motion to stay a trial
where discovery was almost complete because "[w]e are too far along the road to justify
halting the journey while the defendant explores an alternate route"). Recent data shows
that in a typical patent infringement lawsuit where $1,000,000 to $25,000,000 is at stake,
the average litigation costs are $2,000,000, while costs for discovery alone exceed
$1,000,000. See Cheryl L. Johnson, Was Markman Wrong in Tasking Judges with Claim
Construction? The Promises and the Reality, in HOW TO PREPARE & CONDUCT
MARKMAN HEARINGS 2004, at 9, 88 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No.

G-795, 2004) (citing data from American Intellectual Property Law Association, Report of
the Economic Survey 2003 (2003)). For lawsuits involving less than $1,000,000, average
litigation costs are approximately $500,000, of which $290,000 is for discovery. Id. And
for lawsuits involving more than $25,000,000, average litigation costs are approximately
$3,995,000, of which $2,500,000 is for discovery. Id.
153. Tap Pharm. Prods. v. Atrix Labs., Inc., No. 03 C 7822, 2004 WL 422697, at *1, 70
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1320 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 3, 2004) (order granting motion to stay
proceedings when PTO approved request for examination before plaintiff brought suit);
Purolite Int'l Ltd. v. Rohm & Haas Co., Civ. A. No. 91-2740, 1992 WL 142018, at *3, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857, 1858 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1992) (order granting motion to stay
proceedings); Harris, 1991 WL 217666, at *4, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789; United
Sweetener USA, Inc. v. Nutrasweet Co., 776 F. Supp. 212, 217 (D. Del. 1991) (order
granting motion to stay proceedings); see also, Auvil, supra note 144, at 337-39.
154. Wayne Automation Corp. v. R.A. Pearson Co., 782 F. Supp. 516, 519-20 (E.D.
Wash. 1991) (order denying motion to stay proceedings when nonmoving party had
conducted extensive discovery and case was set for trial); Output Tech. Corp. v.
Dataproducts Corp., No. C90-1782D, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20168, at *7-8, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1072, 1074 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 1991) (order denying motion to stay proceedings
when significant discovery had occurred and trial date was set); Enprotech, 1990 WL
37217, at *1-2, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1320 (order denying motion to stay proceedings
when discovery was nearly complete and case was set for trial); E.I. DuPont de Nemours
& Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 711 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 n.9 (D. Del. 1989) (noting
reluctance to grant stay when litigation had advanced through trial, appeal, and remand);
Freeman v. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 1987) (denying
motion to stay proceedings when discovery had concluded, trial date was set, and the first
of two consolidated actions was filed two and one-half years prior to the decision); Toro
Co. 1984 WL 1244, at *2, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 638 (denying motion to stay proceedings
where the suit had been pending for over three years because the stay "would accomplish
little, other than the delay of disposition of a suit which has, until now, run an overly
protracted course"). If, however, the court believes that the potential benefits of the
reexamination outweigh the disadvantages of the stay, the court may grant a stay. See,
e.g., Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (order granting
motion to stay proceedings five years into litigation and twenty days before trial);
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If the reexamination occurs after the litigation, a stay is obviously
unnecessary-instead, an infringer must seek relief from the judgment on
the basis that the PTO has subsequently invalidated the patent-in-suit.
Whether the courts will allow the PTO's reexamination results to control
their final judgment depends, in part, upon whether the reexamination
results may be applied retroactively16
D. Potential Retroactivity of PTO Actions
The Supreme Court has recognized that "the Constitution neither
prohibits nor requires retrospective effect" of legislative or judicial
actions."' Accordingly, the Court has not applied a "'principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity"' to subsequent rulings of invalidity on
prior final judgments."' Rather, once the Court determines that a ruling
establishes a new principle of law, the Court considers the merits of each

pending case, weighing the inequity imposed by retroactive application
of the decision. 9

The Court has used this principle of selective

retroactivity in both civil and criminal cases.160
Courts apply the same principle of selective retroactivity to
administrative actions, particularly adjudicatory actions. 161 When an
agency adopts new policies, the circuit courts of appeal review the agency
decisions by performing a balancing test to determine if it is unfair to
Middleton, 2004 WL 198669, at *1, *10 (granting motion to stay proceedings eight years
after start of litigation and two months before trial); Emhart, 1987 WL 6314, at *1, *34, 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1889, 1892 (order granting motion to stay proceedings eighteen
months into litigation even though significant discovery had occurred); Loffland Bros. Co.
v. Mid-Western Energy Corp., No. CIV-83-2255-E, 1985 WL 1483, at *1-2 (W.D. Okla.
Jan. 3, 1985) (order granting motion to stay proceedings after significant discovery,
pretrial conference and setting of initial trial date); see also, Auvil, supra note 144, at 33839.
155. Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2).
156. See discussion infra Part IV.D.
157. Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 628-29 (1965).
158. Id. at 627 (quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S.
371, 374 (1940)).
159. Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 (1971) (citing Linkletter, 381 U.S.
at 629). In Chevron, the Supreme Court looked to the "'prior history of the rule in
question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further retard its
operation."' Id. at 107 (quoting Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 629). The Court concluded that a
Louisiana one-year statute of limitations should not be applied retroactively because it
"would deprive the respondent of any remedy whatsoever on the basis of superseding
legal doctrine that was quite unforeseeable" and would produce "the most 'substantial
inequitable results."' Id. at 107-08 (quoting Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701, 706
(1969)).
160. Id. at 105-06.
161. See NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 378-79 (1967); PIERCE, supra
note 103, § 13.2, at 882-83.
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apply the modified policy retroactively."' The reexamination of63 a patent
is adjudicatory in nature, and is therefore held to the same test.'
After a court reaches final judgment in a patent infringement suit,
there is no bright-line rule regarding the controlling effect of a posttrial
reexamination.' 6" In StandardHavens Products,Inc. v. GencorIndustries,
Inc.,'65 ina motion for stay of injunction and stay of proceedings pending
reexamination of the patent-in-suit, the defendant argued that a patent
claim cancelled during reexamination would
be void
ab initio, thereby
••
.166
removing the basis for a judgment on infringement. The District Court
for the Western District of Missouri disagreed, denying defendant's
motions for stay of injunction and stay of proceedings, because the
reexamination results could not void the court's final judgment.161 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed in a nonprecedential opinion,
indicating that the final decision from the PTO's reexamination
proceeding would control the injunction and damages award.
While
the district court discussed the fairness of the stay of injunction and the
underlying public policy of the Reexamination Statute,

169

the Federal

Circuit did not comment on these issues, explaining its holding on the
basis that the "issues of patent validity and infringement [were not]
incorporated into a final judgment that would moot the issue of a stay
pending completion of the [reexamination]."' 7 °
The Federal Circuit in Standard Havens did not answer the question
presented here-whether an adjudicated infringer may seek a second
bite at the apple by requesting an ex parte reexamination of the patentin-suit at the PTO, hoping for a nullification of the final judgment of the

162. See Retail, Wholesale & Dep't Store Union v. NLRB, 466 F.2d 380, 390 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (disapproving retroactive overruling); Laidlaw Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 99, 107
(7th Cir. 1969) (upholding retroactive overruling); NLRB v. Majestic Weaving Co., 355
F.2d 854, 860 (2d Cir. 1966) (disapproving retroactive overruling).

163. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152-54 (1999).
164. See Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 810 F. Supp 1072, 1076
(W.D. Mo. 1993) (stating that there is no known "case or rule of law that holds that a final
judgment in a separate lawsuit, in a separate jurisdiction, which may or may not be
rendered at some undetermined point in the future would control and, indeed, void this
Court's judgment"), rev'd, 996 F.2d 1236, No. 93-1208, 1993 WL 172432 (Fed. Cir. May 21,
1993) (unpublished table decision).

165.
166.

810 F. Supp. 1072.
Id. at 1075.

167.

Id. at 1075-76; cf Ultrak Inc. v. Radio Eng'g Indus., Inc., 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)

1530, 1531-32 (N.D. Tex. 1999) (refusing to stay enforcement of a final judgment even
though all claims were rejected through a reissue proceeding).
168.
169.
170.

Standard Havens, 1993 WL 172432, at *1.
Standard Havens, 810 F. Supp at 1076-77.
Standard Havens, 1993 WL 172432, at *1.

2005]

The Ex Parte Reexamination Statute

district court.' While the Federal Circuit did not answer this question in
Standard Havens, one or more high profile cases currently pending
appeal may certainly raise it again.
V.

THE CURRENT LAWS ARE INADEQUATE TO PREVENT AN
INFRINGER FROM NULLIFYING A FINAL JUDGMENT

A. The PatentLaws Are Not Designed to Prevent a Posttrial
Reexamination
The underlying purpose of patent law is to promote the useful arts and
sciences by rewarding inventors for their scientific innovations with a
But where
grant of a limited monopoly on their patented invennons.
the invention is not patentable in the first place, an inventor should not
have a right to this limited monopoly. 7 4 Thus, Congress intended the Ex
Parte and Inter Partes Reexamination Statutes to allow members of the
public to challenge the validity of a patent, placing those patents that are
For similar reasons,
truly unpatentable back into the public domain.'

171. See id.
172. See, e.g., Patents/Reexamination: Browser Patent Infringed by Microsoft Is
Rejected in PTO Reexamination Action, 67 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 413,
417 (Mar 12, 2004); Sullivan & Morrow, supra note 6. In March 2005, the Federal Circuit
affirmed in part the district court's decision in MercExchange, upholding the jury's
determination on validity and infringement of one patent, and reversing a ruling that a
second and third patent were not invalid. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d
1323, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Patents/Infringement:Auction Patents Receive Mixed Rulings
In Suit Against eBay and Half com, 69 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J. (BNA) 532 (Mar.
25, 2005). EBay has since petitioned the Supreme Court for writ of certiorari, on a
question related to injunctive relief. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, MercExchange, (No.
05-130) (U.S. July 25, 2005), 2005 WL 1801263. Meanwhile, the PTO issued office actions
rejecting claims in two of the MercExchange patents being reexamined, setting the stage
for conflict between the PTO and the courts. See Sullivan & Morrow, supra note 6. In
August 2005, the Federal Circuit upheld some of the district court's infringement rulings in
Research In Motion, but vacated other infringement rulings, as well as the injunction and
damages awards. NTP, Inc. v. Research In Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir.
2005). Meanwhile, the PTO is still reexamining the patents-in-suit, setting this case up for
conflict between the PTO and the federal courts. See Patents/Infringement:Mixed Rulings
Delivered In Rehearingof Blackberry Infringement Suit, 70 Pat. Trademark & Copyright J.
(BNA) 402 (Aug. 5, 2005).
173. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (2000); Kewanee Oil Co. v.
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,480 (1974).
174. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 331 n.21
(1971) ("It is just as important that a good patent be ultimately upheld as that a bad one
be definitively stricken.").
175. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-318; see also In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(observing that the "innate function of the reexamination process is to increase the
reliability of the PTO's action in issuing a patent by reexamination of patents thought
'doubtful"'). The Federal Circuit further noted that
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Congress provides accused infringers the statutory right
to defend
176
themselves by challenging the validity of a patent in court.
A challenger who is unable to prove in court that a patent is invalid is
estopped from requesting an inter partes reexamination of that patent,
but not an ex parte reexamination.1 7 7 The Ex Parte Reexamination
Statute does not currently restrict the class of individuals who can
request a reexamination, nor does it restrict the timing or the
circumstances in which an individual may request a reexamination.1 78
The only restriction is that a requester must present evidence, in the form
of patents and publications, of a "substantial new question of
patentability" for a director to order reexamination.
Consequently, the
Ex Parte Reexamination Statute clearly does not preclude an adjudicated
infringer from requesting reexamination of a xs°patent after a final
judgment is reached in a patent infringement suit.
B. CollateralEstoppel Does Not Bar an Infringerfrom Requesting a
Reexamination of the Patent-In-Suit
Despite the statute's deficiencies, collateral estoppel should bar an
adjudicated infringer from rearguing the issue of validity of the patent-insuit before the PTO.1 8 ' After all, collateral estoppel bars an unsuccessful
party from relitigating the same issue in a subsequent lawsuit.8 2 Why,
then, may an adjudicated infringer raise substantially the same issue in

[w]hen a "substantial question" exists respecting the correctness of that grant, it
does not conflict but coincides with the nature of the grantee's right [to exclude]
when the government reexamines the propriety of the grant it has made, and
thereafter reaffirms the grant, substitutes a new grant (amended or new claims),
or withdraws the grant in whole or in part ....
Id. at 859.
176. 35 U.S.C. § 282.
177. Id. § 317(b).
178. See id. § 302 (providing that "any person at any time may file a request for
reexamination").
179. Id. §§ 302-303(a).
180. See id. § 302.
181. Cf Marchon Eyewear, Inc. v. Tura LP, No. 98 CV 1932(SJ), 1999 WL 184107, at
*34 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 1999) (estopping the defendant from asserting the invalidity of a
patent in a lawsuit related to a second product, where in a previous lawsuit he contended
that the patent-in-suit was invalid); Tensar Corp. v. Tenax Corp., Civ. No. H-91-1460, 1992
WL 443904, at *3 (D. Md. Oct. 16, 1992) (estopping the defendant from relitigating any
defenses of invalidity and unenforceability in a subsequent lawsuit involving the same
patent, but a different (or modified) product than had been previously fully litigated
between same parties).
182. See Marchon, 1999 WL 184107, at *3-4; Tensar, 1992 WL 443904, at *3.
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the PTO that it lost at trial? '83 Yet the courts have 84concluded that
collateral estoppel does not bar posttrial reexaminations.'
The Federal Circuit justifies this anomaly by pointing to the procedural
differences between PTO and district court inquiries into patentability
and validity, respectively. 8 5 Recall that collateral estoppel only applies
where the issue in both proceedings is identical."' 6 Here, the issue before
both the federal court and the PTO is whether the claimed invention
satisfies the statutory requirements for a patent. 87 However, the
evidentiary record and the burden of proof in the federal court and PTO
are not identical.'" In addition, the infringer/requester may not fully
participate in the ex parte reexamination proceeding, which is limited to
communications between the patent owner and the PTO. 189 Further, the
requester does not have the right to appeal a decision of the PTO.'9'
In support of the argument that collateral estoppel should apply, the
The second
remaining elements for the defense are satisfied.
requirement-that the issue was actually litigated in the prior
proceeding-is met because the defendant and the patent owner litigated
the validity of the patent-in-suit during the infringement lawsuit.' 9' The
third requirement for collateral estoppel is also met because the issue of
patent validity is a "critical and necessary" predicate to the finding of
liability for infringement.' 92 Finally, the fourth requirement that the
litigants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the prior
proceeding is met whenever the district court proceeding results in a final
judgment. 93
Essentially, the collateral estoppel analysis suffers because the PTO
and court proceedings each have a different record, require a different
evidentiary burden, and involve different parties insofar as the

183. Cf. Marchon, 1999 WL 184107, at *34; Tensar, 1992 WL 443904, at *3.
184. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1429 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
185. See id. at 1427-28.
186. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Il. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971);
Dana v. E.S. Originals, Inc., 342 F.3d 1320, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Mother's Rest. Inc. v.
Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1569-70 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
187. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566-67
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (en bane), vacated, 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
188. Ethicon, 849 F.2d at 1427; Leung, supra note 106, at 484.
189. 35 U.S.C. §§ 132-133, 305 (2000); Syntex (U.S.A.) Inc. v. U.S. PTO, 882 F.2d 1570,
1572-73 (Fed. Cir. 1989); 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(g) (2003).
190. M.P.E.P., supra note 18, § 2273.
191. Dana, 342 F.3d at 1323.
192. Id.; Mother's Rest. Inc. v. Mama's Pizza, Inc., 723 F.2d 1566, 1571 (Fed. Cir.
1983).
193. Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 163-64 & 164 n.11 (1979); Dana, 342 F.3d
at 1323.
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defendant-requester may not participate in the PTO's reexamination. '94
Consequently, collateral estoppel does
not preclude posttrial ex parte
95
reexaminations of the patent-in-suit.
C. Separationof Powers Does Not Prevent the PTOfrom Reviewing a
PatentAdjudicated "Not Invalid"
While separation of powers precludes the PTO from reviewing or
overruling the final decision of an Article III court, the PTO is not
technically •"reviewing"
the decision of the federal district court in a
196

reexamination.
A final judgment of the federal court in an
infringement case is that the patent is not invalid in view of the record in other words, the accused infringer did not meet the evidentiary burden
necessary to prove that the patent-in-suit was invalid. 197 In comparison,
the ex parte reexamination grants the PTO the opportunity
,
•
198to review a
patent anew, to correct defects in the original examination.
The PTO
places the burden on the patent owner to prove that the claimed
invention is patentable. 99 In reexamining the patent, the PTO considers
neither the judicial record, nor the factual determinations of the judge or
jury; it considers only the patents and printed publications that are
presented to it.200 Thus, the PTO is not "reviewing" the decision of the
194. See Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427-29 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
195. See id.
196. See id. at 1428-29; see also discussion supra Part IV.A.
197. Panduit Corp. v. Dennison Mfg. Co., 810 F.2d 1561, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(determining that under 35 U.S.C. § 282 courts are required only to evaluate whether the
challenger met "its burden of establishing invalidity in the particular case before the
court"); Shelcore, Inc. v. Durham Indus., Inc., 745 F.2d 621, 627 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("A
patent is not held valid for all purposes but, rather, not invalid on the record before the
court."); Envtl. Designs, Ltd. v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 713 F.2d 693, 699 n.9 (Fed. Cir.
1983). Once a federal court determines the validity of a patent, it has the effect of a final
judgment. See Pharmacia & Upjohn Co. v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 170 F.3d 1373, 1380 (Fed.
Cir. 1999). At this point, the PTO loses its power to review the decision of the federal
court, or to issue a rule inconsistent with the federal court's determination. Chi. & S. Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
198. 35 U.S.C. §§ 301-307 (2000); see Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603
(Fed. Cir.) (finding that the reexamination statute is in the class of curative statutes,
intended "to cure defects in administrative agency action with regard to particular patents
and to remedy perceived shortcomings in the system by which patents are issued"),
modified, 771 F.2d 480 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
199. In re Etter, 756 F.2d 852, 857-58 (Fed. Cir. 1985); 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2004).
200. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104; M.P.E.P., supra note 18, § 2258 ("Rejections [on
reexamination] will not be based on matters other than patents or printed publications,
such as public use or sale ....

A rejection on prior public use or sale ...

cannot be made

even if it relies upon a prior patent or printed publication ....
); see also Quad Envtl.
Techs. Corp. v. Union Sanitary Dist., 946 F.2d 870, 875 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that
evidence of commercial use was "not within the reexamination examiner's jurisdiction");
M.P.E.P., supra note 18, §§ 2216-2217.
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federal district court; rather, it is conducting an independent factual
the courts and
has stated that 202
adjudication.2 1 In fact, the Federal Circuit....
the PTO may properly arrive at conflicting determinations.
D. The Ex Parte Reexamination ProceedingIs Open to Abuse
Allowing an adjudicated infringer to request reexamination of a patent
after a final judgment creates an inefficient system. One of the intended
benefits of the Ex Parte Reexamination Statute is that it provides a
forum for invalidating patents without a lengthy and expensive trial.2°34
the millions.
Current patent infringement litigation costs are in
Litigation can last years, the trial itself occupying weeks or months of

court and jury time.0 5 In comparison, a reexamination is likely to cost far
less and conclude more quickly than litigation. 2° ' However, allowing
posttrial reexaminations negates the intended economic benefits because
by requesting a reexamination after litigation, an adjudicated infringer
adds the cost of the2 7 reexamination to the cost of the litigation, rather
than reducing costs.
Further inefficiencies are created in the appeal of a reexamination
decision. A patent owner may appeal the PTO's decision to the Federal
Circuit, or seek a civil action to compel the PTO to confirm patentability,
forcing the federal court system to rehear the issue of the patent's
validity. 26 Because res judicata does not preclude this action, and stare
decisis does not require the Federal Circuit to affirm an earlier decision,
the infringer may essentially use the ex parte reexamination procedure to

201. See Etter, 756 F.2d at 857-58.
202. Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Constant v.
Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that
Congress has the power to delegate power to both the federal courts and the PTO to
invalidate patents).
203. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6462-63; Motsenbocker, supra note 13, at 892.
204. See Johnson, supra note 152, at 88 (commenting that average patent infringement
litigation costs in 2003 were $2,000,000 for a suit in which $1,000,000 to $25,000,000 is at
stake); Thayer et al., supra note 76, at 26 (reporting that the median cost for a patent suit
is $1,200,000).
205. See Thayer et al., supra note 76, at 26 (reporting that a patent infringement trial
may last several years, and almost ten percent require twenty or more days of trial).
206. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4, reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6463;
Motsenbocker, supra note 13, at 894. The PTO has launched new initiatives to reduce the
pendency of reexamination proceedings so that all future reexamination proceedings will
be completed in less than two years. Press Release, United States Patent and Trademark
Office, USPTO Improves Process for Reviewing Patents (July 29, 2005), http://www.uspto.
gov/web/offices/com/speeches/05-38.htm.
207. See Motsenbocker, supra note 13, at 894.
208. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 141,145,306 (2000).
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create redundancy in the federal court system at the expense of both
public and private resources.29
VI. A CALL FOR REFORM TO PREVENT ABUSE OF THE Ex PARTE
REEXAMINATION STATUTE AT THE EXPENSE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
RESOURCES
A. Legislation to Revise the Ex Parte Reexamination Statute

In order to prevent an adjudicated infringer from getting a second bite
at the apple, Congress should revise the Ex Parte Reexamination
Statute. 2'° Reexaminations should not be available where they could
have the effect of nullifying the decision of a federal court."' However,
any revision to the statute must maintain the congressional intent to
correct initial examinations by allowing anyone to challenge the validity
of a patent without litigation.2 2
One way of effecting such a change is to define the threshold of a
"substantial new question of patentability" so that the PTO must
consider admiistatie
and anexclude
issues that
juicil
213 were previously presented in
administrative and judicial forums. The result would be that only truly
"new" evidence-evidence not considered by either the PTO or the
courts-would be sufficient to initiate a reexamination.214 This would

209. See Stevenson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 713 F.2d 705, 711 & n.5 (Fed. Cir. 1983)
(holding that "the doctrine of stare decisis is generally an inappropriate one in patent
litigation" unless "the record in the second suit is substantively identical to the record
produced in the first suit"). But see Mercantile Nat'l Bank of Chi. v. Howmet Corp., 524
F.2d 1031, 1032 (7th Cir. 1975) ("A litigant who attacks the validity of a patent before a
court that has held the patent valid in a prior case has the burden of persuading the court
that there is a 'material distinction' between that case and the case at bar."). However, the
Federal Circuit is the current precedential authority on patent law. Markman v. Westview
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
210. Cf supra Part V.A.
211. See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,113-14 (1948)
("It has long been the firm and unvarying practice of the Constitutional Courts to render
no judgments ... that are subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.").
212. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N 6460, 6462.
213. See Kaufmann Co. v. Lantech Inc., 807 F.2d 970, 976 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
requirement of "substantial new question of patentability" protects patentees against
having to respond to unjustified reexaminations. Id. at 976 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 961307, pt. 1, at 7, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6466).
214. Cf. 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2000) ("Once a final decision has been entered against a
party in a civil action ... then neither that party nor its privies may thereafter request an
inter partes reexamination of any such patent claim on the basis of issues which that party
or its privies raised .... ); In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 791 (Fed. Cir. 1997);
In re Recreative Techs., 83 F.3d 1394, 1398-99 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that in a
reexamination, an examiner may not reject a claim based solely on prior art cited in the
initial examination).
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preclude adjudicated infringers from requesting a reexamination without
producing more compelling evidence than they presented at trial.2 5
However, this creates a risk that an accused infringer could strategically
withhold patents during litigation, not introducing them into evidence
and intending to use them later to initiate a reexamination. Thus, a
better revision to the statute would be to incorporate a limitation
prohibiting a party who was unsuccessful at invalidating the patent in a
civil suit from requesting a reexamination based on issues that were
raised or could have been raised during the civil suit. 21 6 Like inter partes

reexamination, this would preclude infringers from requesting a
reexamination unless they could produce evidence that was unavailable
at trial.2 7
Either revision encourages defendants in infringement suits to avail
themselves of the reexamination procedure before or during litigation, as
Congress intended.2 8 The proposed revision to the statute would also
force the record before the court and the PTO to be different, which
would prevent the PTO from acting inconsistently with the Article III
courts, and maintain the balance between the executive and judicial
branches.2 9 Finally, the proposed revision would still allow invalidation
of patents, but only where justified. 220
B. FederalCourts Should Not Allow Reexaminations To Alter or Affect
FinalJudgments

Recognizing that a revision to the statute is unlikely in the near future,
the Federal Circuit should set a firm precedent not allowing
reexaminations to control or alter the final judgments of a district
court.21 ' Although it seems unfair to enforce an invalid patent against an

infringer, the infringer had a fair chance to prove the invalidity of the
215. Cf. Portola Packaging,110 F.3d at 788; Recreative Techs., 83 F.3d at 1398-99.
216. See 35 U.S.C. § 317(b).
217. Id.
218. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6463.
219. See Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103,113 (1948).
220. See H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4, reprintedin 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N at 6463.
221. Standard Havens Prods., Inc. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1072, 1075-76
(W.D. Mo. 1993), rev'd, 996 F.2d 1236, No. 93-1208, 1993 WL 172432 (Fed. Cir. May 21,
1993) (unpublished table decision). This could be accomplished, in part, by denying an
infringer's posttrial motion for relief of judgment based on reexamination results that
cancel one or more claims of the patent-in-suit. See id. at 1075. In fact, the European
patent community has proposed a set of rules pertaining to the patent litigation system, in
which "the retroactive effect of the revocation of a European patent ... shall not affect
any final decision on infringement enforced prior to the revocation of the patent."
EUROPEAN PATENT ORG., DRAFT AGREEMENT ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A
EUROPEAN PATENT LITIGATION SYSTEM art. 43(5) (Feb. 16, 2004), available at
http://www.european-patent-office.org/epo/epla/pdf/agreement-draft.pdf.
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222

Having requested relief
patent at trial and did not sustain his burden.
from the federal court rather than promptly requesting a reexamination,
an adjudicated infringer should be bound by the final judgment of the
court223and barred from the benefit of a reexamination of the patent-in-

suit.

Further, the district courts should continue to deny motions for stay in
the late stages of litigation, and should absolutely prohibit stays beyond a
certain point in the proceedings. Currently, the balancing test used by
the courts is effective at allowing the courts to make case-by-case
224
However, beyond a certain point in
determinations based on equity.
the litigation, a stay is not justified. 225 Because each suit has its own
timeline, deciding when to draw the line can be difficult; however, one
logical place to start is the end of discovery.226 At this point, the parties
should be aware of all prior art that could be submitted to the PTO with
a reexamination request-any delay in requesting reexamination beyond
221
this point is simply unnecessary.
Establishing these rules will deter an accused infringer from delaying a
request for reexamination beyond the stage when the court and litigants
222. Ethicon v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1427-29 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (stating the burden of
proof required to show invalidity of a patent); Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc.,
848 F.2d 1560, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (affirming the power of the courts to adjudicate the
validity of patents).
223. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 17 (1982).
224. See, e.g., Output Tech. Corp. v. Dataproducts Corp., No. C90-1782D, 1991 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 20168, at *7-8, 22 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1072, 1074 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 25, 1991);
Wayne Automation Corp. v. R.A. Pearson Co., 782 F. Supp. 516, 519-20 (E.D. Wash.
1991); Enprotech Corp. v. Autotech Corp., No. 88 C 4853, 1990 WL 37217, at *1-2, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1319, 1320 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1990); E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 711 F. Supp. 1205, 1208 n.9 (D. Del. 1989); Freeman v. Minn.
Mining & Mfg. Co., 661 F. Supp. 886, 888 (D. Del. 1987); Toro Co. v. L.R. Nelson Corp.,
No. 81-1019, 1984 WL 1244, at *2,223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 636, 638 (C.D. II. July 25, 1984).
225. Cf. cases cited supra note 224.
226. FED. R. Civ. P. 16(b) (providing that a district judge must enter a scheduling
order that, among other things, limits the time to complete discovery). A later alternative
might be thirty days before the trial when, by statute, both parties are required to give
notice to the adverse party of any patent and publication that may be relied on to argue
the issue of patent validity. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000). However, this is very late in the
litigation timeline, and both parties potentially have already invested millions of dollars in
discovery and pre-trial motions, so it is not necessarily fair to the parties. Softview
Computer Prods. Corp. v. Haworth, Inc., No. 97 CIV.8815 KMW HBP, 2000 WL 1134471,
at *2, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633, 1635 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2000) ("'Parties should not be
permitted to abuse the process by applying for reexamination after protracted, expensive
discovery or trial preparation."' (quoting Digital Magnetic Sys., Inc. v. Ansley, No. Civ-811190-T, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12395, at *2, 213 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 290 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 1,
1982)).
227. FED. R. CIV. P. 26; Softview Computer Prods., 2000 WL 1134471, at *2, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635.
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have expended significant public and private resources to litigate the
issue of validity.228 An accused infringer has ample opportunity to
request a reexamination in the early stages of litigation, when it is fair to
both parties for the court to stay litigation. 229 Any further delay is a
waste of the opposing party and court's time and money.230 Congress
specifically intended the Ex Parte Reexamination Statute to provide a
vehicle for invalidating patents without lengthy, costly litigation.2 1 By
setting rules that prohibit infringers from benefiting from posttrial
reexaminations, the courts can give effect to congressional intent.232
VII. CONCLUSION
The loophole that allows an adjudicated patent infringer a second bite
at the apple after a full and fair trial needs to be closed tightly.233
Adjudicated infringers should not be able to take advantage of the ex
parte reexamination procedure, where the effect will be to absolve them
Yet, the current patent laws allow this
from their tort liability.3
possibility, and principles of collateral estoppel and constitutional law
cannot prevent adjudicated infringers from taking advantage of it.
Consequently, both legislative and judicial action is necessary.
First, Congress should revise the Ex Parte Reexamination Statute so
that the threshold determination of a "substantial new question of
patentability," upon which a reexamination is ordered, may not be based
on patents and publications that the requester presented or could have
228. See Softview Computer Prods., 2000 WL 1134471, at *2, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1635.
229. See Purolite Int'l Ltd. v. Rohm & Haas Co., Civ. A. No. 91-2740, 1992 WL
142018, at *3, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1857, 1858 (E.D. Pa. June 15, 1992); Robert H. Harris
Co. v. Metal Mfg. Co., Civ. No. J-C-990-179, 1991 WL 217666, at *4, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1786, 1789 (E.D. Ark. June 21, 1991); United Sweetener USA, Inc. v. Nutrasweet Co., 776
F. Supp. 212, 217 (D. Del. 1991); see also Auvil, supra note 144, at 337-39.
230. See Standard Havens Prods. v. Gencor Indus., Inc., 810 F. Supp. 1072, 1077 (W.D.
Mo. 1993), rev'd, 996 F.2d 1236, No. 93-1208, 1993 WL 172432 (Fed. Cir. May 21, 1993)
(unpublished table decision); Auvil, supra note 144, at 343 ("Reexamination was not,
however, perceived to be an instrument by which a litigant could obstruct the resolution of
the dispute. Judicial regard to discernible governing standards can facilitate the legislative
mandate and preserve the credibility of the process.").
231. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460,
6462-63; Motsenbocker, supra note 13, at 892 & n.24.
232. Standard Havens, 810 F. Supp at 1077; H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 4,
reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6463.
233. See Burson v. Carmichael, 731 F.2d 849, 854 (Fed. Cir. 1984) ("There is no
support in the law for repeated bites at the apple. On the contrary, the law whenever
possible reaches for repose.").
234. Cf In re Portola Packaging, Inc., 110 F.3d 786, 788 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re
Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (establishing that
reexamination is not proper when the validity of a patent previously has been established).
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presented at trial. The proposed revision encourages accused infringers
to avail themselves of reexamination before a final judgment in a civil
suit.
In addition, the revision prevents the PTO from acting
inconsistently with the federal courts by distinguishing the reexamination
from the judicial record.
The federal courts should also act to prevent adjudicated infringers
from circumventing a final judgment. The Federal Circuit should set a
precedent disallowing the PTO's reexamination results to alter or nullify
a final judgment that is otherwise binding on an adjudicated infringer. In
addition, the courts should not grant stays in the later stages of litigation,
pending the completion of a reexamination. These judicial rules will
prevent accused infringers from abusing the reexamination process at the
expense of public and private resources. While these actions are
necessary to prevent an adjudicated infringer from getting a second bite
at the apple, they also preserve the original intent of the Ex Parte
Reexamination Statute, and protect the balance of power between the
coordinate branches of government.

